COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

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"I must, always, consider a NATIONAL DEBT AS DANGEROUS TO LIBERTY; for a *Public* "*Debt, of any magnitude,* produces, of course, taxes; the collection of taxes requires revenue officers; "the appointment of these, being in the Executive Government, will, necessarily, extend the influ- "ence of the Crown; and *that extension* must be at THE EXPENSE OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PEOPLE." ——Mr. Sheridan's Speech on the 16th of April, 1790.—See Debrett's Parliamentary Debates, Vol, XVII. page 405.

LETTER II.

TO R. B. SHERIDAN, ESQ. M. P.

SIR, — The *third* charge, which you thought proper to prefer against me, and which I think it right to refute, was, that I was *labouring to produce the annihilation of the National Debt, and thereby to bring about a violation of all public faith.*—Before I enter on this refutation, I must take some notice of the motive, from which you brought forward the charge, and also the extreme unfairness (to give it the mildest possible term), which you discovered in applying it to Mr. Windham. In introducing the Political Register, as a topic of debate, you were actuated partly by the soreness which you felt from its remarks, and partly by a desire to marshal against it all the other part of the London periodical press; and, from the expressions you made use of, from the art and nicety with which you balanced your censure and your praise, it is very evident, that you hoped to effect the double purpose of prejudicing the public against the Register, and of softening the Register with respect to yourself.—Mr. Windham was, by no means, called upon to repel your attack upon me or my work; but, with that faithful attachment to the cause of truth and of justice, which we trace through every situation, which we behold in every action, of his life, he voluntarily stepped forward to express his approbation of my work, and his respect for myself, whom he was pleased to say, he admired for my conduct in America, where, by my own unaided exertions, I had rendered my country services which entitled me to a statue of gold.—This unexpected panegyric on me opened an unbounded scope for your powers of misrepresentation. You immediately asserted, that Mr. Windham had declared his agreement with "*every* sentiment" of mine, thereby proceeding upon an assertion directly in the face of truth. But this part of your speech is too curious, it is too excellent an epitome of your parliamentary reasoning and wit, not to be repeated as often as occasion may serve. "The right "honourable gentleman (Mr. Windham) "has pronounced a lofty panegyric on the "Weekly Register: he has *declared, that "he agrees in every sentiment* contained in "it, and that a statue of gold ought to be "erected to the writer. Statues, now a-"days, are not voted by the Legislature, "but upon private subscriptions. I hope "the right hon. gentleman will immediately "commence one upon the Stock Exchange "of the City of London. The writer, with "whose *every sentiment he agrees,* having "only maintained that the co-existence of "the funds and the monarchy is no longer "possible. *I am,* THEREFORE, *entitled to "assume,* that the right hon. member agrees "with Mr. COBBETT that the *violation* of "*all public faith,* and the *destruction* of *all "public property,* is an immediate and in-"dispensible measure for the protection of "the monarchy and constitution of the "country. I hear a groan from an hon, "and learned friend of the right hon. gen-"tleman. I rejoice to hear so forcible and "surly an expression of his anger and dis-"approbation of the idea I have referred "to. [Dr. LAURENCE said, across the "House, *his meaning was mistaken*]. Then, "said Mr. Sheridan, I am to understand "that the learned Doctor *approves the un-"qualified panegyric bestowed upon Mr. "Cobbett's suggestions,* and that *he equally "wishes to see a statue of gold erected to "him*; nay, I *must presume* his wish to be "not merely a statue, *but a collossal sta-"tue.*"—Oh! the acute logician, the lucid reasoner, the candid disputant! What do you think, Sir, are the sentiments, which a perusal of this passage must produce in the mind of every reader of even common discernment? And can you, without feeling the blush of shame warm your cheek, reflect upon the conclusion which must inevitably be drawn by every *gentleman,* whatever may be his principles, or to whatever party he may belong? I, Sir, write not to that rabble, for whom your speeches are intended; and, therefore, I shall not dwell upon the sophistry, or rather the brow-

beating hard-mouthed slang, in which you replied to Mr. Windham, and which does really resemble the eloquence which we have frequently the mortification to hear from the box of a hackney-coach, or the shafts of a dust-cart. The *assertion* on which your principal inference, with respect to Mr. Windham's opinion, is grounded, is all that I here think it necessary particularly to point out. 'Mr. Windham,' say you, 'approves of Mr. Cobbett's *every* 'sentiment, and allots him a statue of gold 'for his labours; and, as part of these 'sentiments lead to the annihilation of the 'National Debt and the violation of all 'public faith and all public property, I am 'intitled to assume, that Mr. Windham 'wishes to see the National Debt annihila-'ted, and also that he wishes to see a vio-'lation of all public faith and all public 'property.' — Now, Sir, it appears from every report which has been published of this debate, as well as from the evidence of persons present, evidence which I am sure you will not attempt to controvert, that Mr. Windham never said, that he agreed in "*every* sentiment," expressed by me; and, as to the allotment of a statue of gold, though the figure concluded a very high eulogium, that allotment by no means implied any such agreement as the one which you imputed to Mr. Windham; for, where, for instance, is the man, who will deny that Dryden deserved the statue, which has since been erected to his memory; yet, where is the man that agrees in *every* sentiment of Dryden? Besides, Mr. Windham did, as evidently appears from the face of the debate, distinctly confine the reward, which he was pleased to allot me, to my conduct *in America*. That was complete: it was become a portion of history, fixed and unchangeable. My public life in America had received its consummation, so that sentence might be confidently passed upon it, one way or the other. Mr. Windham did, indeed, declare, in general words, the high sentiments which he entertained of my present work, and of myself; but, the point of the panegyric and the motive of the reward was my *former service*. And thus the order of things was preserved, not inverted, as in the case of your mob-courting vote of thanks to the volunteer corps. In nowise therefore was the statue of gold connected with the sentiments contained in the Politicol Register: for *no one* sentiment, much less *every* sentiment, of which, did Mr. Windham by his eulogium on me, assume a responsibility, any more than you, by your eulogium on the daily papers, rendered yourself responsible for all the falsehood and all the nonsense circulated through those vehicles, the conductors of which, though honoured with your personal as well as political friendship, are, for the far greater part, the most stupid and most venal of mankind. It was, moreover, well known to you, that, in several instances, the Political Register contained sentiments differing considerably from those entertained and expressed by Mr. Windham; and as to the topic in question, the expediency of annihilating the National Debt, I had, in the very number of my work which was published on the Saturday preceding the day when your speech was delivered, expressly stated, that I knew of *no one*, who agreed with me in opinion, except, perhaps, Mr. Stock, a City gentleman, whom I knew not, but whom the newspapers were then persecuting, for having had the audacity to prefer cash before funded property. My words were these: "This is a point, on which we stand *quite alone:* we have yet heard of *no one*, friend or foe, except Mr. Stock, who does not *differ* from us as to the necessity of a national sponge." By whomsoever, therefore, this declaration is taken into view, your assuming that Mr. Windham's eulogium on me amounted to a proof of *his* wishing to see the annihilation of the National Debt and of all public faith, must be regarded as a misrepresentation the most flagrant and most foul, and cannot be attributed to any other motive than that of exciting, amongst the ignorant and the selfish, a prejudice against the gentleman, before whom you had sunk, in the opinions of the honourable and the wise. You were, at first, in hopes of extorting from the lips of Mr. Windham some expression, which you would have been able to torture into a disapprobation of my writings, and thereby to represent my principles as *disclaimed* by him. Hence your assuming that he himself was a writer in the Register. If he had denied this, or if he had narrowed the bounds of his approbation, you would instantly have trumpeted to the world, through the channel of your eulogized press, that Mr. Windham had publicly turned his back both on me and my work. If this failed, if you did not succeed in drawing forth any phrase, from which you might infer a *disavowal* of *all* my sentiments, then you were prepared to fix on him an *adoption* of them *all!* To frustrate your views it did not require that he should perceive them. He had only to pursue the dictates of his own honourable mind, which bade him frankly to declare his general opinion of the work and its author,

and to treat your imputations and the unprecedented interrogatories of Mr. Archdale with silent disdain, leaving to me the task of defending my own principles, sentiments, and conduct.

Your charge, as preferred against me, is, that I have maintained, that "the co-"existence of the monarchy and of the "funds is *no longer* possible," and that "the "*violation of all public faith*, and the *destruc-*"*tion of all public property*, is an *immediate* "and indispensable measure for the pro-"tection of the monarchy and constitution "of the country."—This is your charge, as given in the Morning Post, and a charge more completely destitute of truth was, I will venture to say, never preferred by any pettifogger of Hicks's Hall or of Horsemonger Lane.—There are, in this and the preceding volume of the Register, several passages, where I have treated of the funds; where I have, indeed, endeavoured to show the necessity of annihilating the national debt.* But, it is not the speculation, in this simple state, that you wish to charge me with, and to fix on Mr. Windham. You add two very important circumstances: to wit; that I insist upon the annihilation being *immediate*, and that it shall take place in a manner which shall produce *a violation of all public faith* and *a destruction of all public property*. Without these circumstances the charge would have had little weight; for, as to my wishing to see the annihilation of the debt, you must have been well assured, that I only agreed with every man in the kindom, who owns no part of it, and, indeed, with no small number of the stock-holders themselves. Your charge, then, is necessarily reduced to the circumstances of *time* and of *manner*. And pray, Sir, when, where, in what part of my work, have I called for an immediate annihilation of the debt, or proposed a violation of public faith and the destruction of public property? You having left the charge entirely unsupported by proof, and even by a reference to facts, I should certainly be justified in dismissing it with a very laconic reply; but, this mode of proceeding, though I am persuaded it would satisfy you, would not be quite satisfactory to myself. — You have, as the ground of your charge, selected, not the whole of an essay, or set of observations; not the whole of a section, or paragraph; not even the whole of a sentence; but, as you did in the case of Mr. Reeves, only *one member of a sentence*, making no allusion whatever to any part of the context. The words of this detached member were: "whereas we regard the destruction of "the monarchy as certain, unless the "funded debt be annihilated." I do not say even here, "that the co-existence "of the debt and the monarchy is *no longer* "possible;" I do not say, that the annihilation must be "*immediate*;" and, when I have quoted the context, it will clearly appear, that the annihilation, which I have constantly had in view, is a *gradual* annihilation. I was, in the observations alluded to, defending the justice of the direct tax upon the funds, and contending, that Mr. Pitt's objection, which, by the bye, *Mr. Windham supported*, was not well founded; because, I regarded the future additions to the tax as a good instead of a bad thing. "With respect to the *extending of the pro-*"*portion*, it was," said I, "a prominent "idea of our own, where we stated, that "the 5 per centum now laid upon the "interest was only a small *beginning* in the "good work, which was *finally* to relieve "us from that mill-stone, which has so "long been sinking us, deeper and deeper, "into every species of disgrace.—Here, "however, we disagree with Mr. Pitt, "who does not seem to regard the tax "upon the funds as necessary to the sal-"vation of the state; *whereas, we regard* "*the destruction of the monarchy as certain, un-*"*less the funded debt be annihilated;* and this "cannot, as far as we are able to perceive, "be conveniently and effectually done, "except by *a tax*, a direct and unequivo-"cal tax upon the funds; or, in other "words, a deduction from the interest "due to individuals on the capital stock. "We hear a terrible out-cry, excited by "this opinion; but we despise this sort of "clamour and abuse as much as we did "the howling of the mob, when they "broke our windows, because we refused "to rejoice at the peace. We are fully "persuaded, that our opinion is correct. "It is the result of long thinking upon the "subject; and has now been communi-"cated to our readers, not from any factious "or party motive, but from a desire *gra-*"*dually* to prepare them for an event, "which we regard as at no great distance, "and which if it came upon the country "all at once, and totally unexpected, "might be productive of infinite mischief, "but which *if anticipated*, and if met with "only common fortitude, cannot fail to "raise this nation to a degree of power and

* See Register, Vol. III. 515.—P. 918 to 924.—P. 948 to 950.—Vol. IV. p. 88 to 91.—P. 154 to 158.

" glory that it never before attained."—* Was this, Sir, to insist upon an " *immediate*" annihilation? Mr. Addington's tax, which I was defending, would have annihilated only 5 per centum per annum of the capital stock, or, which is just the same thing, would have cut off only an additional 5 per centum per annum of the interest. This process would have required *twenty years*, wherein to effect the annihilation: and, let me ask you, Sir, if you really think that the interest on even the present debt will continue to be paid for that length of time? In my letter to Mr. Addington, where this subject was first broached by me, I remarked, by way of anticipating the objections which might be urged against me, " that, " if I am told of the miseries, " which this measure will bring upon those, " who are so unfortunate as to be stock-" holders, I deny that they will be a hun-" dredth part so great as is generally ima-" gined; because, *as the extinction will not be* " *effected all at once*, people will sell out, in " proportion as their apprehensions in-" crease; and, as those, who have nothing " but the funds to depend upon, will be " most timid, they will sell first; so that, " at the close of the " market," the loss " will be found to be pretty fairly dis-" tributed." * — Do I here say, that the funds and the monarchy can no " *no longer*" co exist? Do I here call for an *immediate*" annihilation? And, as I approach the date of your speech, do you find any alteration in my sentiments? " We do *not* say, we " have *never* said, that the " *present struggle* " *cannot be terminated without an annihilation of* " *the national debt;* but we do say, that it " cannot be so soon terminated, that it " cannot be terminated so well, and, that, " if the debt continue, it is very probable, " that, at last, we shall conclude another " disgraceful and short-lived peace." This passage was published only five days before your speech was delivered; and I should, Sir, be very glad to hear how you will satisfy the world, that your misrepresentation was not intentional, and that it ought not to be regarded as one of those foul and unlawful blows, by which a sinking and vindictive combatant sometimes endeavours to maim his antagonist.—To endeavour to effect an immediate annihilation of the debt is, however, less offensive against the rules of political justice, than to endeavour to destroy all *public faith* and all *public property*. What you mean by " all " public property" is not, indeed, very clear. If you mean *all funded property*, then the phrase is redundant, because synonimous with *national debt*, of my evil designs upon which you had spoken in the former member of the sentence; and, if this be not your meaning, I am really at a loss to know what it is; for as to public property, in the correct sense of the words, as to the royal forests, and the like, you could hardly intend to insinuate that I had any lurking intention to destroy them. Throwing aside, therefore, this unmeaning expletive, let me beg you to lay your finger upon the passage, where I have recommended the " destruction of all *public faith*." If you had discovered such a recommendation, *you* ought to have been very careful not to be the first to find fault with it; you, Sir, who have employed much more than half the time since I was born, in endeavouring to blot from men's minds the very name of public faith. You would not have been the proper person to turn accuser on this occasion; but again I ask you to lay your finger upon the page, where I have given way to the profligate politics, of which you have had the temerity to accuse me. You cannot: but you may easily point to a passage containing a complete refutation of your charge, and that, too, placed at the head of the very first observations, which I ever made as to the expediency of annihilating the national debt. " Whether the tax upon the funds" [which I regarded as the certain means of doing away the debt] " be *just* or not, is a " question, which depends upon the re-" sult of another question, to wit, whether " the tax be *necessary to the existence of the* " *state*. You " [Mr. Addington] " seem " to imagine, that the world will regard " this direct tax upon the funds as a direct " and flagrant *breach of national faith*, which " it most assuredly is, unless the previous " question of absolute necessity can be " clearly made out; because, the agree-" ment with the stock-holders is, that they " shall receive such and such dividends, sub-" ject to *no deduction whatever;* and, for the " punctual adherence to this bargain the " faith of the nation is pledged. On that " faith it is, that thousands and hundreds " of thousands of persons have deposited " their all in the hands of government. " But, the first law of every land, the first " duty of those who administer the govern-" ment is, to secure the *existence of the state*. " This law of self-preservation supersedes " every other law; and, therefore, if a " tax upon the funds has this sanction, it

* See Vol. IV. p. 90.
* See Vol. III. p. 924.

" stands in need of no other. The tax is, " in that case, *no breach of national faith;* " because, to constitute such breach, the " nation must want the *will* to fulfil its en- " gagements, and, it never can be said " to want the will, if it has already gone " as far as it can go without producing its " own destruction as a state. Many other " arguments suggest themselves in support " of this position; but, if the case of ne- " cessity exists, what I have said already, " Sir, sufficiently justifies the tax, and, if " the necessity does not exist, all that can " possibly be urged by the most ingenious " reasoner, will fall far short of producing " conviction."* ——That *the necessity does exist*, I afterwards state. I state it, indeed, in the passage, which you have garbled, and even in the very words, which you impute to me; for, if " the " *co-existence* of the monarchy and the funds " be *no longer possible*," then there exists an absolute necessity for the annihilation of the funds; and, if that necessity does exist, then is the act of annihilation *no breach of public faith*, much less is it " the de- " struction of *all* public faith." The necessity, which I contend for, will, I think, hardly be denied by you, who was *glad* at a peace of which you could *not be proud*, because the nation was unable any longer to bear the expenses of war; but, whether you allow of the necessity, or not, whether the necessity exist, or not, has nothing to do with the charge against me, wherein you assert, that I am seeking, in the annihilation of the national debt, the " destruction of all *public faith*," whereas, I have not only never proposed such destruction, but have taken some pains to show, that the measure which I propose would *not* be a breach of public faith, because it is called for by absolute necessity. Whether, therefore, this necessity does or does not exist, my principle is sound, and my object honourable. I may have deceived myself as to the resources of the nation, but I have protested against any mode of relief which should, in the smallest degree, impair that faith, which you charge me with an intention to destroy root and branch.—Here I should dismiss this part of my subject, did I not think it necessary to say a few words as to the motive, to which you have chosen to ascribe my speculations relative to the national debt. That Mr. Sheridan, whose attacks on the funding system were, for many years, as regular as the return of the seasons; that Mr. Sheridan who, in speaking of this system, has exhausted his copious vocabulary of terms of reproach and contempt, and who, for fourteen years opposed, in some way or other, every tax that was imposed for the support of this system; that Mr. Sheridan should now become the partizan of the funds and the advocate for public faith, is a circumstance that would be sufficiently striking, even though it were unaccompanied with the no less singular one of his having resolved on this new line of conduct for the purpose of protecting the government against me, who have heretofore made no inconsiderable exertions to stem that torrent of anarchy, on the troubled waters of which Mr. Sheridan exhibited so conspicuous a figure. The first moment that I touched upon the subject of the finances, I was careful to guard against imputations, such as I foresaw that the hunters after popularity would have recourse to, and such as you, in the present instance, have employed. I, therefore, explicitly stated, that I did not regard money as the principal source of national strength, and that, so far from desponding at the depreciation of public credit, I was thoroughly convinced, that a national bankruptcy would not disable us from maintaining our present dominions, and recovering all the honours, of which we had been stripped by a degrading and ignominious peace. " Coupled, therefore," said I, " with this declaration, no state- " ment, no conclusion, of mine, however " disadvantageous to the financial affairs of " the country, can possibly be attributed " to a desire to create despondency in the " hearts of the people, or to embarrass the " operations of government. I wish to " convince the people, that they cannot, if " they would, and that they ought not, if " they could, rely, for their safety, on the " pecuniary credit of the state."* On a more recent occasion I observed, that the true way of convincing the enemy, that his war upon our finances would be useless, as to the success of his main design, was to state explicitly to the world, that we were not at all afraid of the consequences of what is called national bankruptcy; " for," said I, " while we attempt to make people be- " lieve, that such an event *cannot possibly* " *happen*, they will certainly think, that we " regard it, if it should happen, as *irretriev-* " *able ruin and destruction*; and, therefore, as " we can never completely remove their " *doubts*, the best way is to set the bug-bear

* See Vol. III. p. 918.

* See Vol. III. p. 514.

"at defiance."†—Thus, Sir, in this, as in every other respect, my motives evidently are precisely the contrary of those, which you have attributed to me. Ignorance of this you cannot plead, because the passages I have here referred to are not only in the same work, but they make part of the very same letters and essays, to which you have alluded as the foundation of your charge; a charge brought forward from no very laudable motives, totally unfounded in truth, and supported by nothing but barber-shop rhetoric, by a sort of loose unprincipled banter, intended to raise a laugh amongst the ignorant, and to silence the voice of wisdom and of reason, purely by volubility and noise.—I am, Sir, &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke-street, Westm. Aug. 24, 1803.

An Address to the British People on the Subject of the threatened Invasion: written in the Neighbourhood of Windsor.

Britons prepare:—prepare to meet the foe,
With bold defiance of the threaten'd blow.
The aim against th' existence of the throne
Involves designs subversive of your own.
Your welfare and the welfare of the state
Depend, for ever, on a common fate.
For the firm spirit, which the state defends,
Protects yourselves, your families, your friends.
'Tis yours, with souls undaunted, to advance
To curb the daring insolence of France.
Shall Gallia's arms dismay her art beguile
The manly guardians of Britannia's isle.
Her hostile menace shall their vengeance rouse,
Victorious wreaths shall deck their valiant brows.

When Rome's ambitious leader, Cæsar, came,
Incited by insatiate thirst of fame,
The doubtful victory his legions gain'd
Was more by stratagem than arms obtain'd;
And stratagem and arms alike had fail'd,
Had concord 'mongst the British chiefs prevail'd.

Britons unite and fearless brave the shock,
Your Empire stands an adamantine rock.
England and Scotland with Hibernia join'd,
May bid defiance to the world combin'd.
One by allegiance, language, social love,
And one in danger will they ever prove.
No sep'rate int'rests now divide their cause,
The same their rights, their motives, and their laws.
And quickly shall the rash invader know,
The foe to one is deem'd a common foe;
Encroaching on their native shores shall learn
Their hearts alike with indignation burn.
The sanguinary crime, the foul disgrace,
Which damns the fame of Ireland's *rude* race,
Springs from misguided zeal in ruffian souls,
But not the nation's character controuls.
For genuine worth and honour's nicest sense,
Intrepid courage without vain pretence.
And loyalty with highest grace of mind
Are in Hibernia's *polish'd* sons combin'd.

Perfidious treason will they view with scorn
They, now united, feel as Britons born:
And dire as is the horrid scourge of war,
Which spreads its devastation wide and far,
In self-defence shall Britons fear to die?
Or will they sink to abject slavery?
Or shall this happy isle again be curst,
Of all pernicious evils with the worst?
Shall anarchy resume her mad career,
Again usurp her dread dominion here?
Where ev'ry heart a patriot glow should feel,
And ev'ry hand protect the public weal.
Shall Briton's sons elate in Gallia's praise,
Dare here the standard of revolt to raise?
Dare here enroll a rude rebellious band,
To welcome Britain's foes on British land!
To welcome foes, whose rough infuriate mind
Abhors the social order of mankind;
Whose wild aggression o'er the world extends,
Whose proffer'd aid in devastation ends:
Whose friendly zeal, whose brotherly embrace,
O'er empires by ensanguin'd steps we trace:
With such allies can British hearts unite,
With fierce invaders of all public right?
Whose highest joy from wasteful ruin springs,
Subverting altars and dethroning kings:
Who prowl abroad with more than savage rage,
The scourge and scorn of an enlighten'd age;
To blow the character of polish'd times,
With new, with hideous, and atrocious crimes:
Like fiends impell'd by murderous desire,
To conquer with exterminating ire;
Who smile at mercy, with contemptuous hate,
Though captive thousands kneeling supplicate:
The refuge seek, where wounded numbers lie,
Whose anguish claims the kindest sympathy,
(Their fellow soldiers, countrymen, and friends,
Devoted to their own delusive ends;)
There, with dissembled grace and art refin'd,
Raise the faint prospect of the sinking mind,
And then, too horrid for the human soul!!
Contrive, by poison, to destroy the whole.*
Athiests avow'd no qualmish horrors rise
To daunt them from profanest enterprize;
Alike devout, as suits their impious plan,
With Christian, Pagan, Jew, or Mussulman.
Debas'd are nations, who have kiss'd the rod,
Nor turn'd to vindicate themselves or God.

Go ask what honour, what important gain
Has France, in friendship, forc'd on humbled Spain?
Is now Helvetia's valiant race more free
In trammels yoked of Gallic liberty?
Go ask in Rome of that redoubted shade
Of pow'r, which once the trembling world obey'd,
How Papal dignity and sway advance
Beneath the pious auspices of France?
The frugal Belgium ask, whose golden hoard
He consecrates to Gall's imperious lord.
Does gainful commerce now unshackled thrive?
His own courageous spirit still survive?
That spirit, which, with indignation fir'd,
With dignity and fortitude inspir'd,
Brav'd the proud pow'r of bigotry and Spain,
And burst a vengeful tyrant's galling chain,
Now sinks appall'd and crouching courts the hand,
Whose rueful aid enslaves its native land.

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† See Vol. III. p. 949.

* Sir Robert Wilson's History of the British Expedition to Egypt, p. 74, 75, 76, 77.

Shall Britons thus their boasted triumphs prize,
Resign their fame, their honour compromise?
Supinely shrink, when foes their coasts besiege,
And yield as vassals to a foreign liege?
The freedom purchas'd with their fathers' blood
Full oft a direful conflict has withstood,
And Gall's insulting menace shall appear,
An object more of folly than of fear.

Lo! yonder stately pile, august domain *,
Whose tow'ring turrets crown the fertile plain,
Its hallow'd scite from Edward's birth rever'd
Itself by Edward in his greatness rear'd;
Greatness, which only lofty minds can own,
Whose virtues, prov'd in conquest, grace the throne.
Such our third Edward prov'd, and such his Son,
And fame immortal by their conquests won;
For Britons then with martial ardour fir'd,
To mightiest deeds of enterprize aspir'd.
By valour urg'd they boldly dar'd advance
Pursuing conquest in the heart of France.
Nor threats alarm'd, nor numbers rous'd their fears,
To valour yielded Crecy and Poictiers;
At Agincourt, when Henry led the field,
'Twas valour made e'en ten-fold numbers yield;
And later times may Britain proudly boast,
'Till to the mem'ry Marlb'rough's name be lost;
'Till we forget the glory of the brave,
And cease to sigh o'er Abercromby's grave.

Is then our native prowess sunk so low
That Briton's fear invasion from their foe?
Shall all their laurels, in an instant, fade,
Touch'd by the flimsy breath of gasconade?
Assail'd in fam'd Eliza's splendid reign,
How impotent the vaunted fleets of Spain?
How impotent was France, whose thund'ring boast,
Great Hawke aveng'd on Gall's securest coast?
How impotent was France, when Nelson bore
Eternal trophies from th' Egyptian shore?
And still shall Britain's navies rule the main,
And still unsullied glory shall attain.
True to themselves shall Britons strike the blow
Of sure destruction on their threat'ning foe:
For his is not the cool delib'rate threat,
The sage design of men in council met:
'Tis not the firm defiance of the great,
But petulance arising from defeat:
A restless tyrant's mad and braggart dare,
From disappointment, perfidy, despair.
Howe'er his tribe affect their fate to brave,
For Britain's ruin 'though they wildly rave,
Her ever circling seas and wooden walls,
Shall still defy the tyrant till he falls.

Yon regal dome † rever'd from Edward's name,
Still boasts a Monarch of exalted fame;
Mild and benevolent his kingly sway,
His upright mind unconscious of dismay;
His life the model of what life should be,
His rule the stately rule of majesty.

A Monarch urg'd by no ambitious views,
Who zealously a nation's good pursues,
'Though firm in its defence the sword to draw,
Yet never violates establish'd law,
On peaceful arts, with calm delight, intent,
Who ne'er by rapine seeks aggrandisement;
Whom science owns as patron and as friend,
Whose grandest schemes to gen'ral welfare tend;
Beneath whose shield unequall'd commerce thrives
And pure religion e'en at court survives;
To him is ever due his regal state,
And subject minds his sceptre consecrate;
To him his people boundless off'rings bring
A willing tribute to a patriot King.
Aw'd by the retrospect of former times,
When e'en the Crown has sanction'd basest crimes,
Would British hearts, in homage to the throne,
A grateful sense of its protection own;
And equally to threat'ning tyrants prove,
The Throne protected by the people's love.

The dastard slave, who would their minds suborn,
Shall feel their hatred and receive their scorn;
Their King, their country, wives and children claim,
And those attach'd by Friendship's sacred name;
And all the interests of social life,
A firm forbearance from domestic strife;
But, if a hostile band approach their coast,
Let it be then the manly Britons' boast,
We spurn the threat of merciless defeat,
We seek no shelter, flee to no retreat,
But bravely here defend the gen'ral good,
'Till the last drop shall fall of British blood.

Regis et Patria Amator.

Oxford, August 2d, 1803.

* Windsor Castle.
† Windsor Castle.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Order of His Britannic Majesty, in Council, for granting reprisals against the Ligurian and Italian Republics. Dated, August 17, 1803.

At the Court at St. James's, the 17th of August, 1803, present the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.—Whereas in the countries styling themselves the Ligurian and Italian Republics, measures of hostility have been adopted against his Majesty's subjects; and whereas the said countries cannot but be considered as absolutely dependent on, and under the controul of the government of France; his Majesty is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects of the said countries styling themselves the Ligurian and Italian Republics, so that as well his Majesty's fleets and ships, as also all other ships and vessels that shall be commissioned, by letters of marque, or general reprisals, or otherwise, by his Majesty's Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great-Britain, shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods belonging to the persons inhabiting the countries styling themselves the Ligurian and Italian Republics, and bring the same to judgment in any of the Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions; and, to that end, his Majesty's Advocate General, and the Advocate of the Admiralty, are forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to his Majesty at this Board, authorising the Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral, or any person or persons by them empowered and appointed, to issue forth and grant letters of marque and reprisals to any of his Majesty's subjects, or others whom the said commissioners shall deem fitly qualified in that behalf, for the apprehending, seizing, and taking the ships, vessels, and goods belonging to the persons inhabiting the countries styling themselves the Ligurian and Italian Republics; and that

such powers and clauses be inserted in the said commission as have been usual, and are according to former precedents; and his Majesty's said Advocate General, with the Advocate of the Admiralty, are also forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to his Majesty at this Board, authorising the said Commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral to will and require of the High Court of Admiralty of Great Britain, and the Lieutenant and Judge of the said Court, his Surrogate or Surrogates, as also the several Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions which shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance of, and judicially proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and reprisals of all ships and goods that are or shall be made, and to hear and determine the same, and according to the course of Admiralty, and the laws of nations, to adjudge and condemn all such ships, vessels, and goods as shall belong to the persons inhabiting the countries styling themselves the Ligurian and Italian Republics; and that such powers and authorities be inserted in the said commission as have been usual, and are according to former precedents; and they are likewise to prepare and lay before his Majesty at this Board a draft of such instructions as may be proper to be sent to the said several Courts of Admiralty in his Majesty's foreign governments and plantations for their guidance herein; as also another draft of instructions for such ships as shall be commissionated for the purposes afore-mentioned. — From the Court at St. James's, the seventeenth day of August, one thousand eight hundred and three.— Portland, P. —Chatham.—Castlereagh.—Hobart.— Hawkesbury.—C. F. Greville, V. C.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Circular Letter from Lord Hobart, to the Lords Lieutenant of Counties, authorizing the Suspension of some of the Clauses of the General Arming Bill, and directing the Number of Volunteer Corps, to be raised by each Parish. Dated Downing Street, August 18, 1803.

My Lord,—The zeal, loyalty, and public spirit, which continue to be manifested in every part of the kingdom, having had the effect of producing voluntary offers of service to so considerable an amount as to render it unnecessary for his Majesty to order and direct the Lieutenant, or Deputy Lieutenants of the County of ———— to cause the persons comprised in the first, second, and third classes of persons enrolled for military service, in conformity to the provisions of the Act of the 43d Geo. III. cap. 96, or any, or either of them, to be trained and exercised in the use of arms; I am to inform your lordship, that it is his Majesty's pleasure to suspend for the present such of the provisions of the act as require the men enrolled for military service to be trained and exercised, subject, nevertheless (conformably to the 53d clause of the said act) to such conditions as to the number of effective men to be constanly existing in the Volunteer Corps of the County, and to such other rules and regulations as to exercise and muster, or inspection by general or other officers, as to his Majesty shall seem necessary.—In order, however, to enable his Majesty, if he shall judge it advisable, at a future period, to resort to the clauses respecting the training and exercise, your lordship must be aware of the absolute necessity of carrying into execution those provisions of the Act which relate to the enrolment in the several Counties and Parishes, and to the returns which are to be made to the Secretary of State.—I am further to acquaint your lordship, that the inconvenience which must unavoidably arise from carrying the volunteer system to an unlimited extent, has determined his Majesty not to authorize, at present, any additional Volunteer Corps to be raised in any County where the number of effective members of these corps, including the yeomanry, shall exceed the amount of six times the Militia, exclusive of the Supplementary quota, making in the county of men, and in providing that number, your lordship will avail yourself of your own knowledge and experience, with a view to such a selection as may be best suited to local considerations.—But in the event of the effective numbers of the corps already recommended by your lordship, having arrived at ————, you will postpone the communication of any further offers, until his Majesty shall be pleased to signify his intention to increase the volunteer force in the County under your lordship's charge.—I have the honour to be, &c.

HOBART.

To His Majesty's Lieutenant of the County of

Plan of a Volunteer Naval Armament for the Protection of the Coast, transmitted to the Lords Lieutenants of the Maritime Counties by Lord Hobart.

A regular establishment for the inrolment of seafaring persons under the denomination of Sea Fencibles, having been formed by the Board of Admiralty, upon the line of coast more immediately opposed to the enemy, it is thought adviseable that measures should be taken for a further extension of that system, and for rendering the services of that description of Volunteers available, as well for the naval defence of the country, as for the purpose of manning the batteries upon the coast. With this view, it is proposed, first, That it be recommended to the Lords Lieutenants of the Maritime Counties to co-operate with the Board of Admiralty in obtaining the inrolment of all sea-faring men, not applicable to the service of the navy, upon their respective coasts, under the general denomination of Sea Fencibles. Secondly, That it be recommended to the principal sea-port towns to equip, at their own expense, a certain number of armed vessels and hulks, to be stationed for the better security and protection of such ports, and to be appropriated to, and manned by Sea Fencibles, who shall take charge of them, and be exercised on board at the guns as often as may be required. Thirdly, That where the proportion of Sea Fencibles, which any place can furnish, is greater than such place can find shipping to employ; and likewise where any place is capable of providing men, but unable to procure vessels; in both these cases vessels shall be furnished by government. Fourthly, That as colliers and coasting vessels are well adapted to be armed as gun-boats, it be recommended to the principal merchants and owners in every port in this kingdom, to fit * their vesselss of that description with slides between decks, and loop-holes in the combings of their hatchways, for close quarters; these vessels to carry two guns forward, and two aft, to fight on either side, as well as fore and aft. Fifthly, That when the vessels are reported ready, guns and ammunition shall be put on board by government, free of expense to the owners; the masters giving a receipt and voucher to return them when demanded, and to keep a regular account of the expenditure of the stores. Sixthly, That these vessels

* The expense of such fitting has been calculated under 54l.

be fitted with a ring and eye bolts for guns, and that small vessels be prepared to receive large oars, that they may be able to act in a calm, if necessary. Seventhly, That the said vessels be under orders to attend to, and obey, the signals and directions that may be made to them by the commanders of his Majesty's ships, or from the signal stations on shore, and when detained, that they be entitled to demurrage according to their regular tonnage, at the same rate as common transports; the time of detention to be certified by the officer who may order it. Eighthly, That the said vessels on arriving at and sailing from port, be subject to be visited by the commanding officers of the Sea Fencibles of the district.

INTELLIGENCE.

FOREIGN.—The Chams of Erivan, Sur, Gheutsi, Hoé, and Tir, sent ambassadors to Constantinople, to complain of the encroachments which the Russians are daily making upon their ancient possessions. The Porte not being disposed to engage in hostile discussions with the Emperor, recommended a patient forbearance on the part of these chiefs, assuring them, at the same time, that he did not doubt that Russia would speedily remove the cause of their complaints.—Gen. Brune has demanded, in the name of the French Republic, that the Grand Signior shall exclude all British ships from the Turkish ports and shut the entrance of the Dardanelles against their commerce.—Notwithstanding the order of the Senate lately issued by the Ligurian Republic forbidding the importation of any English commodities, many vessels, laden with those commodities, have evaded the strict search, which the order directs shall take place, and have entered Genoa. In consequence of the supplies that have been thus furnished, the price of British manufactures and colonial produce has suffered considerable diminution. — The Spanish money ships continue to arrive in the ports of Spain, and active military and naval preparations continue to be made in different parts of that kingdom. His Catholic Majesty is said to have declared, in answer to some communications from the British government, that it is his sincere wish, that the pacific relations between the two countries may remain unbroken.—M. Champagny, the French minister at Vienna, has recently held frequent conferences with Count Cobentzel. It is supposed that this intercourse is preparatory to the departure of M. Champagny, who will soon return to France, to fill an important station in the marine.—The 15th of August has been celebrated, at Paris, with considerable pomp, as the anniversary of the Birth of the First Consul, of Buonaparté's appointment to the consulate, for life, and of the signature of the Concordat. On the same day, M. Le Baillie De Ferrette had an audience, and delivered his credentials as minister plenipotentiary from the Order of Malta.—The Legislative Body of the Batavian Republic adjourned to the 15th of October, after voting a tax of 2 per cent. on property, to defray the expenses of the war; this tax is considered as a voluntary gift, and is to be paid in four instalments, between the 1st of October, 1803, and the 1st of April, 1804.

DOMESTIC.—The accounts which have been received, during the present week, from Ireland, present but gloomy prospects of the condition of that country. The extent of the late conspiracy becomes every day more known, and, the knowledge of those connected with it make it the more alarming, An universal prevalence of dissatisfaction becomes more apparent, and, although the public tranquillity has not been disturbed by any fresh instances of tumultuous discontent, it is generally feared that all the precautions of government will not prevent further insurrections.—Disturbances have arisen in some parts of Scotland, in consequence of an attempt to execute the provisions of the General Defence Bill. In Angushire, particularly, the populace resisted its operation, and committed several acts of violence. The interference of the military has in many instances been found necessary to quiet the opposition which has been manifested.—It is reported that the nephew and niece of Madame Buonaparté, who had been taken prisoners on their return from the West Indies, have been sent to France in exchange for the young ladies who were detained in a boarding school at Rouen.—On the 17th inst. His Britannic Majesty issued an order for granting reprisals against the Ligurian and Italian Republics.—The Right Hon. Charles Yorke, late Secretary at War, has been sworn in, as His Majesty's principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, in the room of Lord Pelham, who resigned. Mr. Yorke is succeeded in the war department by the Rt. Hon. Charles Bragge, who lately resigned the Treasuryship of the Navy, to make room for Mr. Tierney. Several changes, in the subordinate offices, have also taken place, among which is the appointment of Mr. Pole Carew to be under secretary to Mr. Yorke, and Mr. Francis Moore to be deputy secretary to Mr. Bragge. — The Baltic fleet, which has just arrived, is the

largest that ever came to this country. It consists of 381 sail; of which 136 are destined for London, 74 for Hull, 20 for Newcastle, 23 for Leith, 18 for Liverpool, and 110 for different other ports.—According to a statement which has very lately been published here, the number of cargoes of the fishing vessels which entered at the Coast Office in the Custom House, London, was, in 1798, 1407; in 1799, 1623; in 1800, 2167; in 1801, 2668; and in 1802, 3255; amounting, in all to 11120. According to the same statement, 2238 tons of fresh Cod, Haddock, Skaite, Thornback, &c. and 186,200 fresh Mackarel, were brought to Billingsgate market, in the season of 1802, by the different candidates for the bounties granted by the Treasury; and, in the season of 1803, 3576 tons of fresh Cod, Haddock, Skaite, Thornback, &c.; 866,095 fresh Mackarel, 4,677,500 fresh Herrings, and 10,309 bushels of fresh Sprats.

MILITARY.—Several Bodies of French troops have began their march from the interior of Italy towards the shores of the Mediterranean, The army of observation in the south of Italy, under the command of Gen. St. Cyr, is daily receiving reinforcements: it occupies, at present, that part of Naples which extends from the frontiers of the papal states to Otranto and Tarentum. Part of the two divisions which are posted between Mantua and Verona, have received orders to pass the Adige, and take their route by Ferrara and Ancona, into Naples. Not more than 12,000 men will then remain in the environs of Mantua, and on the borders of the Austrian frontiers. —Troops destined to strengthen the army in Hanover are now passing through Westphalia. The cabinet of Berlin has consented that they should traverse that part of the principality of Munster which belongs to Westphalia; and the Prussian general Blucher has had several conferences with the French general for the purpose of regulating this passage. The number of French troops in Hanover, exclusive of Osnaburgh, amount to 19,600, which are thus divided, 4480 infantry and 840 cavalry in Callenburg; 4623 infantry and 1155 cavalry in Lunebourg; 860 infantry and 260 cavalry in the Duchy of Lauenburg; 2970 infantry and 1050 cavalry in the Duchies of Bremen and Verden, and the province of Hadeln; and 890 infantry and 500 cavalry in the county of Hoya.—It is said that a French camp of 15,000 men, will be formed towards the beginning of September, about five leagues from Brussels, on the road to Namur.—The camp on Gossel-heath will be broken up. The French are withdrawing from Overyssel to the southern part of the Batavian Republic, particularly towards Zealand, Bergen-op-zoom, &c. The head quarters of the Batavian General Bruce will be removed to Ter Goes, where a camp will be formed. Gen. Dessolles, with his division, from the territory of Osnaburg, will occupy Overyssel, and Gen. Cassagnes will remove from Dwentar to Gourda, which as well as the other towns in that department will receive strong garrisons; the army will be formed nearer the coast. 12,000 men are proceeding towards the coast of North Holland; 15,000 are assembled in Zealand, and a large detachment has been embarked at Bergen-op zoom for Zierikzee. Strenbergen has received a considerable body of French troops; and five battalions of Batavian infantry from Gossel-heath have arrived in the Isle of Walcheren. At Flushing, Middleburg, and throughout Zealand they are busied in preparing for the invasion of England.

NAVAL.—On the 1st of August, Capt. Mundy, in the Hydra, captured the French lugger Le Favori, of 4 guns. The capture was made near Tongues, by the boats of the ship, under the direction of Lieut. Tracy. The crew of the lugger run her up near the branch and landed, but notwithstanding their being aided by a large part of the military on shore, Lieut. Tracy succeeded in bringing her off.—On the 13th Capt. Rose, in the Jamaica, off the Isle de Bas, captured the French privateer Fanny of 2 guns and 24 men.—On the 14th Capt. Paget, in the Endymion, captured the French privateer Le General Moreau, of 16 guns and 85 men; six days from Bourdeaux.—On the 15th the boats of the Cerberus, under the orders of Lieut. Mansel, made an attack on the enemy's shipping in Concalle Bay, but the coast being alarmed, they could only bring off one large fishing vessel. They proceeded, however, to St. Cas Bay, where they were successful in cutting out seven fishing vessels, of 16 or 18 tons each.—On the night of the 16th Lieut. Watt with the boats of the Ville de Paris, passed within the rocks at Ushant, and brought out the French lugger Le Messager, of 8 guns and 40 men.—It is said that Sir Home Popham has been appointed to the command of a secret expedition, for which preparations are now making at Sheerness.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PRINCE OF WALES.——In two former numbers of the present volume †, we thought it our duty to remonstrate against the conduct of ministers, with regard to His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales; and, we derive no small satisfaction from perceiving, that there are very few persons, who do not, on this subject, entirely concur in our sentiments. To *refuse* the Prince a command, while the rest of his Royal Brothers are employed, is to make a distinction so invidious, is to cast such a slur on the character and rank of his Royal Highness, is, in effect, to give such a stab to the monarchy, that no person, who does not wish to see the destruction of that monarchy, or, at least, who is not perfectly indifferent as to its existence, can possibly hear of this refusal, without feeling the utmost indignation at the conduct of the ministers, to whom, and to whom *alone*, it can, or ought to be ascribed. The evil consequences, which this attempt to degrade the Prince *must* produce, and the dreadful consequences, which, if persevered in, and followed up by other attempts of the same kind, it *may* finally produce, shall be the subject of a distinct essay in our next number: at present we shall content ourselves with urging the necessity of *publishing the correspondence*, which has, on this occasion, taken place, between his Royal Highness and the ministers.——That it is expedient, that the heir-apparent to the throne should stand high in the opinions of the people, is, we imagine, a position, which even the ministers themselves will hardly attempt to deny; and, disguise the fact how we may, it is absolutely impossible, that, while the transaction, of which we are now speaking, remains enveloped in darkness, the people of this country, whose habit it is to think for themselves, should not entertain *doubts* respecting the character and views of their future Sovereign, doubts not less dangerous to the present safety of the realm than injurious to his Royal Highness. By publishing the correspondence, therefore, the danger would be removed, and the injury palliated, though by no means redressed.—It has been officially declared, that his Royal Highness has offered his services as a general in the army, employed for the defence of the country; for the defence of the people, over whom he is to reign, and whose peace and happiness and safety must, in a great degree, depend upon his wisdom and his courage. All that the people know of, as the consequence of this offer, is, that it has been *rejected*. They are well aware, that his Royal Highness has been a military man from his youth; they perceive his Royal Brothers and Cousin invested with high military commands, and they, moreover, see the latter sent to infuse, by *his* presence, a military spirit into the people of that principality from which his Royal Highness takes his title! And, can it be supposed, that the people do not wish to know the cause of this distinction? Had the slanders of the King-killing saints reduced the nation to that state of indifference, gloomy indeed would be the prospect before us! As to the objection founded on the field-marshalship of his Royal Highness the Duke of York, that might have been obviated by placing the Prince at the head of the irregular army, a measure which would, in every point of view, have been attended with immense advantage to the service. Besides, if there had still been an objection to assigning the Prince a command in this Island, what objection could there be, or can there now be, to giving him the military or civil command in Ireland, where there is every reason to hope and to believe, that his presence alone would give greater security to the country than an army of an hundred thousand men, and where, without some such step, it is greatly to be feared, that tranquillity will *never* be restored?——No satisfactory reason can, therefore, be conceived, why, at this time of universal zeal and exertion, his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales should be condemned to an irksome, not to say disgraceful, inactivity; and the nation demands from the ministers, and beseeches from his Royal Highness, that explanation, which can be afforded only by the correspondence, which has, on this subject, taken place between them. For want of an explanation of the truth, falsehoods are circulating in every direction; falsehoods the most atrocious in themselves, and of a tendency the most dangerous. We shall not dwell upon the insinuations which have been made as to the "*manner*," in which the Prince tendered his services, the "*exorbitant demands*" with which his offer was clogged, the "*interest-*" "*ed*" and "*aspiring*" views, apparent in his conduct. These wicked and base insinuations will produce little effect upon well-informed persons; but, then, how few are there who answer that description! The minister did, indeed, condescend to acknowledge, that the Prince's offer was made in "a most handsome and gallant manner;"

† See pages 192 and 218.

but, it is understood, in the world, that these are words of course; and, besides, their effect was instantly destroyed by the mysterious close of the minister's declaration, from which the natural inference was, that something was suppressed in *tenderness* to the Prince. Thus it was that the affair went forth to the world; and, under the improving influence of those wretches, who are never wanted to anticipate, and, we hope, in the present instance, they have surpassed, the wishes of their superiors, the Prince's injuries have been increased a thousand-fold. The truth is, that, unless the ministers publish the correspondence, we, for our parts, cannot see how the Prince can avoid doing it; for, to suppose him *willing* to bear the conclusions, which the partizans of ministers draw from his silence, would be to join in the slander that we have so decidedly condemned. The publication of the correspondence will also destroy the effect of the insinuations, by the means of which it is attempted *to fix upon another great personnage* the blame of refusing the offers of the Prince. The nation will then see, that the refusal came from the *ministers*, and, from the nature of their excuses, will be able to discover the real motives, by which they have been actuated in injuring and insulting a personage, whom, next to their Royal Master, it was their bounden duty to cherish and to honour, but whom, for reasons too obvious to mention, they wish to keep in a state of helplessness and obscurity.——We shall, in our next, resume this important subject.

Russia.—The policy of this court is by no means decisive. It is not inimical to us; but, there appears to be no reason to suppose, that it is *hostile* to our enemy. As far, perhaps, as is necessary to put a stop to French encroachments in the North of Europe, Russia may interfere; but, we have been informed, and that, too, from very good authority, that the Russian ministers *are afraid to stir an inch with the persons, who at present hold the reigns of power in this country*. This is what we have frequently predicted: those who abandoned Portugal, the King of Sardinia, the Stadtholder, and the Vendean Royalists, can never expect confidence from any foreign court, which is not under the influence of insanity or of treason. The nation is now suffering for the folly and pusillanimity of its ministers. Were there, in power, men in whom Russia could confide, a Russian fleet would, perhaps, have been at this moment in the Channel, while a Russian army would have been on its march for Italy. We should find it difficult to answer many of the questions of our correspondent Thomas,* who is a very well-informed politician; but, against facts we cannot reason, and we know it to be a fact, that Russia is, and always, since the accession of Alexander, has been, favourably disposed towards this country; and, our readers may rely, that the weakness and pusillanimity of the English ministry are the principal cause of the indecision of Russia. Events may, indeed, lead Russia into the contest; but, till she has decided, there is always danger; and, it must be obvious, that her assistance now, would, at once make a most important change in the complexion of affairs.

Sierra Leone.—It is a considerable time since we endeavoured to draw the attention of our readers to the baneful effects of fanaticism, as displayed in the establishment of this colony. Far be it from us to regret the loss, which has been sustained by the original promoters of this measure; on the contrary, we heartily wish, that their persons and properties were all embarked in the philanthropic experiment; but, we do regret, and we blush for, the weakness of that government, which could be induced to expend such large sums of money, in support of so visionary a scheme. Now, however, we have the satisfaction to learn, that a naval gentleman of abilities and character, has been sent out to enquire into the present state of the colony; and, as his return is daily expected, we venture to predict, that, if his report be made public, it will clearly appear, even to the most incredulous of Mr. Wilberforce's friends, that government and the country have been shamefully deceived and cheated, and that nothing but destruction awaits a colony, which, without ever having produced any one good effect, has cost so many lives, and such large sums of money.——If the few remaining settlers, who, according to the last accounts, had not a foot of land beyond cover of the guns of the fort, and very little of that under cultivation; if these miserable creatures were not already expelled, or cut off by the natives, whom they went out to civilize, it would be a consummation devoutly to be wished, that Messrs. Wilberforce and Thornton, and all the other persons, who are filling our streets with blacks, and raising up amongst us a race of filthy mulattoes, would themselves go to the relief and re-establishment of that colony, on the success of which the civilization of Africa and the happiness of the blacks in the West Indies are said to depend.——Short follies are best, and we do

* See p. 244.

hope, that the government will not be deluded into a longer continuation of its support of the colony of Sierra Leone, which, above a year ago, we endeavoured to convince them was a project too wild to be adopted by any man in his senses.

SUBSCRIPTION AT LLOYD'S. — Some time ago, a number of persons, consisting chiefly of monied men of the City of London, met at Lloyd's Coffee-house, and agreed to commence a public subscription, the ostensible object of which was, to form a fund for the *relief* or *reward* of the "*Defenders of the Country.*" Some stock-holders began the subscription with £20,200 Consols, that is to say, in stock. The fund has been growing ever since, and does, it appears, now amount to £150,000, exclusive of the £20,200 in Consols.——We, for our parts, are no great admirers of public subscriptions of any sort, particularly for the reward of soldiers and sailors. To obviate the base misrepresentations, which would be made of this sentiment, we will, without proceeding farther, just observe, that we wish to see meritorious soldiers and sailors amply rewarded, but, except in very extraordinary cases, we wish not to see these rewards conferred by any others than his Majesty, and those who act immediately under him.——The fund at Lloyd's would not, however, have attracted much of our notice, had not some of the subscribers, or pretended subscribers, to it, made use of their own pretensions to liberality for the purpose of reproaching and insulting the Nobility, Gentry, and Clergy. The first assault of this kind appeared in one of the newspapars, in the form of a letter to the Earl of Suffolk. His Lordship had, in his place in Parliament, made some very just remarks on the backwardness of the City of London; in revenge for which he was, by this insolent writer, tauntingly invited to add his name to the subscription list, and was, at the same time, reminded, that only three of *his order*, had, as yet, shown a disposition to assist in rewarding "our defenders." Accusations of this kind have, from that time to this, frequently appeared in almost all the newspapers, against the Nobility, Gentry, and Clergy. The second class, in this enumeration, might, surely, have been spared; for, thanks to the National Debt and its baneful consequences, the race of country gentlemen is almost extinct; their estates are gone to the nabobs, planters, and stock-jobbers, their children are becoming clerks and waiting maids, while they themselves are pining away upon an income, smaller, in many instances, than that of the man who makes their shoes. The Clergy are, indeed, still a body. The land, the houses, and the produce, which they possess (blessings on our wise and provident ancestors!) *cannot* be entirely swallowed up by the voracious hunters after gain; but, from various causes connected with the increase of factitious wealth, the property of the Clergy has experienced so great a relative diminution, that the *average* income of a clergyman of the established Church *is considerably less than that of a journeyman printer!* What, then, in the shape of money, was to be reasonably expected from these two classes? The Nobility, indeed, are, thank God, yet possessed of great estates: they have, as yet, survived the commercial deluge. But, where is there a nobleman, who does not live up to his income, and who does not, through one tax or another, pay *to the government* every penny, which comes into his hands, and which is not expended amongst the people? Is this the case with the money dealer, or trader of any description? No: he scarcely ever expends a fourth of his income; and, having no dignity to support, the money with which he purchases reputation at Lloyd's he can save by laying down his gig, or letting his country box. Whatever the nobleman gives to a subscription, he must raise out of his bonâ fide property: not so the trader, who gives that, perhaps, which never was, and never would be his. Besides, do the Nobility contribute nothing on this occasion? Are not their servants, their horses, and their own time and attention all employed in the service of their country? And have they not raised ten times as many real effective men as all the traders in the kingdom put together? The remaining country gentlemen have been singularly active: they have every where shown, that, though reduced to a mere handful, they have not degenerated; and, as to the Clergy, it may be safely averred, that the country owes more to their exertions than to those of any other class, the Nobility not excepted. Let any man go through half a dozen parishes, of any county in England, and observe the influence by which the people are put in motion, and, then, let him say whether a stock-jobber, who has squeezed down his ten guineas at Lloyd's, ought, with impunity, to be suffered to reproach the clergy. But, *who* is it that thus calls upon the nobility for subscriptions? A company of merchants, tradesmen, stock-jobbers, loan-jobbers, insurance brokers, and bankers, who are all, indeed, stock-holders, and who issue their invitation from a Coffee-house in the

City of London! We do not blame such persons for collecting a sum of money to give to the soldiers and sailors; because, we believe, that the intention of many of the original subscribers was good; but, we can never allow that the nobility, gentry, and clergy of the whole kingdom ought to be abused, unless they join in this subscription; unless they give their money, merely because a club of stock-holders choose to call upon them for it.——And, then, as to the distribution of the money thus collected. We have already expressed our disapprobation of rewarding military men, still in service, from any other source than that of the government; and, we leave the Public to judge how dangerous must be the effects of leading soldiers and sailors to look up to a committee at Lloyd's. This committee would, if the fund had increased according to the wishes of some weak persons, have become, in the eyes of the common soldier and sailor, another government, and a government too of a nature much more amiable than that which they are bound to serve. Where, we should be glad to know, did this committee acquire the knowledge necessary to distinguish military merit amongst the mass of the army and navy? And when, and by what sort of inquiry and communication, are they to discover who are, and who are not, proper objects of pecuniary reward? And what colonel is there who will not object to their interference in the concerns of his regiment, and who will not absolutely prohibit the distribution of money amongst his men? And what can be more whimsical and absurd than to see the *brigade of guards* subscribing to a fund, which is to be *distributed amongst soldiers, by stock-dealers?* If money be raised, for this purpose, by voluntary subscription, it should be given to the government, and left entirely to its disposal: applied in any other way, a subscription must be injurious to the service, and, of course, to the country.——The bounty of the subscribers is, we are first told, to be extended to "EVERY DEFENDER OF HIS "COUNTRY;" and then it is said, that it is to reach "EVERY LOYAL SUFFERER "THROUGHOUT ALL PARTS OF THE UNI-"TED KINGDOM." It was said that it was to be confined to the wives and children of soldiers and sailors; and Mr. Sheridan proposed to make it operative immediately, by laying part of it out in cloathing for those volunteers, who were willing to put on a soldier's coat in order to avoid a soldier's duty. The final object of the fund has changed its description day after day, and the publication of SIR FRANCIS BARING has rendered it, if possible, more indefinite than ever. But, whatever may become of the money at last, for the benefit of whomsoever it may ultimately be employed, we know, that, hitherto, it has been employed solely for the benefit of the stock-holders themselves; for, according to the statement of SIR FRANCIS BARING, the committee have, with the sum already collected, purchased £100,000 of three per cent. consols, and £100,000 of three per cent reduced, the effect of which purchase must have been to raise, in some degree, or, at least, to support the funds, and thereby to enhance, or, preserve, the value of the property of SIR FRANCIS BARING and his Co.! So that, if, whether by good words or bad words, whether by invitations from Lloyd's or lampoons in the news-papers, the nobility and gentry could have been induced to mortgage their estates, and the clergy to pawn their livings, in order to swell the subscription at Lloyd's, the gamblers in the Alley would have turned their own subscriptions to excellent account. We, for our parts, have nothing to do with the subscription; but those persons who have, we beg leave to ask, why the money is not preserved in cash? Why it is laid out in stock, when, perhaps, stock may have greatly fallen in value, before the money is wanted? The fund is, in our opinion, intended much more for the support of the stocks and for the benefit of the stock-holders, than for the relief or reward of either soldiers or sailors; and, it now appears very evident to us, the first day's subscriptions can be regarded in no other light than the guineas, which Hudibras found on the table of his lawyer: *nest-eggs to make clients lay.*——And this, this is the fund, the *patriotic* fund, for not more largely contributing to which, the nobility, gentry, and clergy, are to be censured and abused! Nor do the pretensions of the committee at Lloyd's end here: they extend to cities, towns, and parishes; and SIR FRANCIS BARING seems to take it very ill, that Cambridge, Birmingham, and Poole, have formed subscriptions of their own for the relief and reward of persons belonging to their several precincts. No: SIR FRANCIS does not understand this: he wishes all the money to come to London: all to pull together in one place, and that place the Stock-Exchange: and, in the height of his resentment, he declares, that those who are natives of places where local or partial funds are raised *must not look to the Fund at Lloyd's.* Thus every part of the *country* is to be stripped of every penny it can spare, in order to bring power and profit to the stock-dealers in London. The nobility, the gentry, the clergy, the county-

traders, the corporate bodies even, all, all are to resign their money and their influence into the hands of the committee at Lloyd's! —But, after all, it is a fact, which we defy the revilers of the nobility, gentry, and clergy to disprove, that they have, *to this very fund*, already subscribed *more liberally* than the nation at large, whether we calculate by numbers of persons, or by amount of sums subscribed, whether the proportion be founded upon the population, or upon the riches of the country.—We conclude with recommending to all those, who have money to spare, to dispose of it in the way which is most likely at once to serve the state, and to preserve their own influence; and by no means, to suffer it to be drawn from them by wheedling advertisements, or bullying paragraphs,

VOLUNTEER CORPS.—Before we proceed to the remarks, which we have to offer upon this important subject, we think it right to notice a paragraph, which appeared in the Morning-Post of Tuesday last. The occasion was, the parading of the Volunteers of St. James's parish, on the preceding day. After some compliments, which no one can be inclined to grudge the corps, the Editor proceeds thus: "yet these are the *rabble*," as Mr. Windham stiled them, "*whom every* "*real General would order out of his way!* "*The rubbish which would only serve to* "*block up the road! The repository of* "*panic, calculated only to infuse dismay* "*through the army they were permitted to* "*join! The frippery incumbrance upon* "*real strength, which a wise commander* "*would at once throw off, as a boxer strips* "*himself of his useless garments, when he* "*prepares for the conflict.* All these insulting sarcasms, though well answered "by Mr. Sheridan at the time, we trust "will *never be forgotten* by the volunteer "corps; that is, by three-fourths of the "people of England. MR. SHERIDAN was "present among the crowd; but being "distinguished by some officers of the "corps, he was invited, with the *most flattering attention, into the kept ground.*"—This paragraph, which, according to the principles and practice of Mr. Sheridan, it would be, by no means unfair to impute to Mr. Sheridan himself, will, when compared with the report of Mr. Windham's words, as published by this very Morning-Post, give the Public a tolerable correct notion of the candour and veracity of the eulogists of volunteer corps: "He," (Mr. Windham), "condemned the *principle* of having recourse to volunteer corps, instead of calling forth volunteer service in other modes. "From the sort of training which these "corps received, there was an opportunity "of judging of the manner in which they "would be brought into action. The companies would be collected into regiments, "and the regiments formed into brigades. "He did not think they would be good for "any thing in that way; neither did he "think, that any judicious officer would "accept of them. It was not true, that "numbers always made strength neither "could that other comfortable saying, that "if they did no good they could do no "harm, be applied in this instance.—They "would incumber the movements obstruct "the roads, and consume the provisions; "and, which should also be a main consideration, they would be a great depository "of panic, if, as was not unlikely, they "once caught it. Under all these disadvantages, any skilful and judicious officer, "instead of accepting their services, would "rather say, place them at a distance. "Such an officer would consider them "as a wrestler would heavy garments, "and say, let me have clear ground, "free from any incumbrance." *—Now, is there any thing here about "*rabble* and *rubbish*," and are these terms applied to "*three-fourths* of the people of England?" Is there any thing here said against the *persons*, who became volunteers? Is not the disapprobation of the Right Honourable Speaker confined to the *nature of the corps?* And is there any gentleman, who will envy Mr. Sheridan that "*flattering attention*, "with which, in return for his vote of thanks, he was invited into the *kept* ground?" Is there an honourable man in the kingdom, who will not exclaim: *much good may it do him!* — While, however, we leave Mr. Sheridan to the enjoyment of his unenvied honours, we cannot forbear to repeat our uneasiness, our serious apprehensions, at the state of *uncertainty*, in which the volunteer corps are placed. Our readers will recollect, that we earnestly besought the government to explain to these corps the precise conditions, on which they were to serve. For want of this explanation, the utmost anxiety is beginning to prevail. We read in the newspapers, that, at Hampstead, a *malicious* report having been circulated, stating that the Volunteers were, *in case of need, to join the regular army*, the Attorney General and Mr. Plomer assembled them, and proved to them that the report was *false* as well as *malicious*. If this be not a mis-statement on the part of the public prints, the Attorney-general is certainly called upon to give an explanation of

* Morning Post, 11th August, 1803.

his opinion; for, if the volunteer corps are not, in case of invasion, for instance, to join the regular army, what use will they be of, and how miserably is our correspondent, in page 301, deceived in his calculation?—As to the *number* of volunteers, it is, indeed, beyond credibility; and, for the sake of the vote of thanks, we are only sorry, that they did not enroll themselves *before* a law was passed for *compelling* them to be *volunteers*, or to run the risk of being *soldiers*. Of the inconvenience and the *enormous expence* of these corps, we shall, hereafter, have occasion to speak: at present we must content ourselves with again beseeching the ministers to give a full explanation as to the *conditions of service*; for, if this system is to be persevered in, such explanation is absolutely necessary to prevent imminent danger to the existence of the state. There are *none* of the volunteers, who expect to march from their parish or district. *None* of them have any idea of being, in any case, made liable to martial law. *None* of them think that they are, in any case, bound to remain in their corps. Either, therefore, they are grossly deceived, or, in their present capacity, they are totally useless; whereas, if a judicious selection of the same persons had been made, and if they had been drilled under proper regulations, even those regulations that were made by the law, they would have been to their country a rock of defence. And, let it not be imagined, that, if these corps should be found inefficient, the breaking of them up will send numbers of prepared young men into the army. No man, that has once belonged to a *deliberative* regiment, can ever become fit for a soldier. Volunteer corps, instead of being preparatory schools to the army, are seminaries of indiscipline, having in their nature just enough of the military to give a professional turn to the insubordination of common life. Observe, too, the injury which a communication with these corps is likely to produce in the army. Volunteer corps are every where: the regular regiments cannot stir from place to place without passing through crowds of men dressed in a military habit yet unsubjected to military duty or law; and, though the British army is exemplary for its discipline, no one will say, that there is nothing to be apprehended from this constant exposure to contamination.

MR. DUMOURIER.——What we said respecting this gentleman, in our last, was said under an impression, that, *without having been pardoned by his Sovereign*, he had been sent for to this country, with an intention of consulting him as to the means and mode of defending it. We now hear, that he *has been pardoned*; and, though he is not a man that we should have sought after, we can have no objection to his endeavouring to repair the mischief, which he assisted to do.——We perceive great rage to prevailing against him in the bosoms of most of the London news-writers: they hate him for returning to his duty and allegiance; for, though the dread of *Cayenne* urges them to oppose Buonaparté, the poison of republicanism still rankles at the bottom of their hearts

IRELAND.——At the head of the next sheet, our readers will find a letter addressed to Mr. Wickham, which we request them to read with attention. It contains an accurate account of all the circumstances connected with the rebellion, which lately broke out in Dublin, and exhibits irrefragable proofs, that the Irish administration, though duly apprized of the danger, had neglected all those precautions, which the nature of that danger called upon them to take. To the numerous and interesting facts related in this letter, we will add one of a most decisive nature On the 23d of July, *the very day on which the Lord Chief Justice was murdered*, a general order was issued for ten men, from each company of every regular regiment, in Ireland, to be allowed to go *ten miles* from their quarters, in order to assist in getting in the harvest.——This is proof incontrovertible, that the country was, as far as its rulers were concerned, in a state of total neglect and abandonment. Suppose, that, during the furlough of these ten men of each company, a general rising had taken place: the absent men would, we will venture to say, have amounted to one-fourth of the whole number of men on the duty list; and, thus would one-fourth part of the effective force been, as to every immediate purpose, completely disbanded. Besides, can any one imagine, that the soldiers thus scattered about the country, would not have been murdered by the rebels? Most assuredly they would, unless they had been disposed to join in the rebellion. Taking into view, then, the facts stated by our correspondent; knowing, as we now do, that the government had timely warning of the danger, what are we to think of the issuing of an order, such as that of which we have here spoken?

Errata in the preceding Sheet.—Motto, l. 7, for *herd* r. *hand*; p. 233, l. 49, for declared r. declined; p. 243, l. 13, for *Jahan* r. *Japan*; p. 244, l. 11, for not only wish r. not only not wish.

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TO THE RIGHT HON. WILLIAM WICKHAM, &c. &c. &c.

Dublin, August 6th, 1803.

SIR,——After an absence of six months, at no ordinary period, permit an inhabitant of this highly favoured land to congratulate you on your happy arrival amongst us. You are not now to learn that nearly a fortnight has elapsed since the dismal tragedy of the murder of the Chief Justice of Ireland was acted in the public streets of this metropolis. Your friends may, therefore, naturally indulge a hope, that your personal safety cannot *now* be much endangered. Anxiously occupied, as you have been so long, at your post in London, in pacific exertions for the safety and prosperity of this country, it is much to be lamented, that the turbulent French and their busy partizans, should have broken in on your tranquil labours. It will not, however, be deemed any extraordinary strain of flattery, to declare, that if safety and prosperity could have been insured, (as they ought in reason to have been) by the kindest official attentions to the Irish gentlemen delegated by this country to the Parliament of the Empire; no minister, since the days of Walpole, would have had a prouder claim to parliamentary gratitude. It has been noticed with universal complacency, here, that those gentlemen made suitable returns to your unwearied ministerial attentions, by loudly and confidently proclaiming, as in truth they were in duty bound to do, their certain *local* knowledge of the halcyon days of peace and tranquillity, which gladdened the smiling face of the Arcadian Paradise: and the happiest impressions of satisfaction and security were necessarily made on the minds of our British fellow subjects. Even the Bæotian class of British subjects, whom after so long an absence, you have at length graciously condescended to cheer by your saving presence, are bound to admit, that his Majesty's principal Secretary of State for Ireland, was adequately employed during the whole of this highly critical period. They cannot forget, that he procured a law to be passed, in the face of clamour and disappointed ambition, for putting our safety beyond all dangers, by re-embodying the Irish Militia. We all know that this constitutional force has been already tried in the arduous conflict brought on by domestic treason and foreign invasion; and we all looked for similar exertions of gallantry and loyalty on a future trial. The men and officers are the same, the enemy is the same; the spirit of the times is the same: then, how can the event be reasonably questioned? The most timid and querulous loyalist must, therefore, be fully satisfied, that the Irish minister, highly renowned for the wisdom, if not the success of his political labours, was most gravely and usefully occupied during his lamented, but necessary and indispensable absence. The most sceptical politician must allow, that the bold, investigating, active chief minister of Ireland, was well warranted, for the attainment of objects so important, to delegate for a time the little domestic concerns of a province to an able coadjutor, who, though sinking under the weight of rejection by a profession, though Irish, not undiscerning, nevertheless, manifested the possession of talents and address, to advance himself from this abject state of humiliation, to the high and arduous situation of second Secretary of State for Ireland. This wise, vigilant, and sagacious statesman, by the meekness with which he has borne his honours, in this unexpected state of sudden and rapid elevation, has made a lasting impression on all ranks of his Majesty's Irish subjects, who were so fortunate as to be admitted to his official presence. But, such is the modesty of Mr. Marsden, that, I apprehend, he has studiously concealed, even from you, Sir, the necessary effects of the wise and energetic system of government, which was steadily pursued during your absence. From what appears to have been said in Parliament by his Majesty's ministers in opposition to the statement of Mr. Windham, it appears, that they were then altogether ignorant of the state of this country. Allow me, therefore, to trouble you, amidst the tranquil leisure which you must now enjoy, with a plain unvarnished statement of the events which took place here during Mr. Marsden's domestic administration.——During a period of eight months, comprehending the entire time of your absence in the metropolis of Ireland, under the eye of government, in the hearing of the resident Irish minister, a conspiracy has been formed and matured, for surprising the Castle and City of Dublin, exciting a general insurrection, and committing an universal massacre, without distinction, of age or sex, of all the loyal inhabitants of Ireland. Whilst you, Sir, and your Irish friends, are, for the best purposes, confidently proclaiming in Parliament, to our British fellow subjects, the lasting tranquillity, and peaceful security of this happy people. In the view of Mr. Marsden, arms, ammunition, military uniforms, accoutrements, camp equipage, hand granades, chevaux de frize, and scaling ladders have been abundantly

provided, and carefully stored in different magazines in the metropolis, for an army of fifty thousand men, without the smallest interruption, let, or molestation from the rulers whom you left behind you. During the same period, similar preparations were made in many different parts of the country without the slightest notice or alarm. Several emissaries from France, composed of notorious inveterate Irish rebels, wisely spared and released from prison on the happy conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, during this period resorted to this metropolis, and visited many different parts of the country without question or danger. They were employed for several months in various parts, but chiefly in the north, and in this city and its vicinage, in organizing, encouraging, and preparing the disaffected of all ranks and descriptions. They quietly and securely completed their preparations, prepared and printed their manifestoes and proclamations, employing a printing press within an hundred yards of the Castle, regularly and methodically. Large parties of veteran rebels from various parts, particularly from the counties of Dublin, Kildare, Wicklow, and Wexford, (the last distinguished as the Marsellois of Ireland), were ordered to repair to the city, which they were to enter, in small divisions, and without arms, in order to avoid suspicion. On the night of the 23d of May, about nine o'clock, the bloody miscreants, so assembled, were regularly armed from their different magazines in the metropolis. The party, who first received their arms, and who were directed to wait for the assistance of their confederates, who were assembling and arming rapidly, impatient of inaction, prematurely commenced the horrible work of carnage and destruction. The unfortunate Lord Kilwarden, accidentally passing through the streets on his return from his country house, is at this critical moment stopped, together with his nephew, a clergyman, dragged from the arms of his daughter, and murdered in a manner too savage for description. Colonel Brown repairing to his regiment on hearing a disturbance in the streets, is first prevailed on to deliver up his sword on a promise of safety, and immediately afterwards is murdered by the treacherous and inhuman villains. Cornet Cole, about the same time, accidentally thrown in their way, on refusing to join them, is instantly pierced with pikes. Several soldiers, passing through the streets, are surprised and murdered. Miss Wolfe, flying from the murderers of her father, brings to the Castle guard the first intelligence of these bloody outrages, which were committed without their knowledge, in the adjacent streets. On the same night a skirmish, under the auspices of Mr. Russel, formerly an officer in the 36th regiment, one of the French emissaries, ushered in by an elaborate proclamation, was attempted in Belfast, but was effectually prevented and suppressed by the vigilance and energy of the military and yeomanry. Different movements were, at the same time, made in other parts; numerous bodies rose in arms in the counties of Dublin and Kildare, different houses were robbed of arms, and the mail-coach passing through Maynooth, was fired upon by a party of rebels near the Roman Catholic College. But as the attack on the Castle and City, had, through the interposition of Providence, been frustrated, the capture of which, was waited for in the country as a signal, the rebels in the morning of the 24th, rapidly dispersed without attempting further outrages.——Such has been the conduct and fortune of the rebels; allow me now, without disguise, to inform you what the conduct of the domestic Irish government has been on this critical and momentous occasion. Do not start with surprise and horror, when I tell you, that authentic, satisfactory, and particular information was given to Mr. Marsden, by different persons of character and respectability in sufficient time to take the most effectual precautions for the general safety. Mr. Aylmer, from the county of Kildare, a gentleman of rank and fortune, Mr. Going, a barrister, Mr. Clarke, an eminent manufacturer, in the morning of the 23d of July, absolutely forced their way into the awful presence of Mr. Marsden, and fully informed him of the insurrection which was to commence the following night. Shudder not with horror, when I tell you, that this information was received by Mr. Marsden with the most supercilious contempt, and the persons of these gentlemen insulted by the most contumelious arrogance. Mr. Finlay gave similar information to Mr. Marsden, and was received and treated in the same manner. The fate of Mr. Clarke is singular, and deserves to be particularly mentioned. Sinking under terror and confusion from the treatment of Mr. Marsden, he returned to his house at Palmerston, where he found a considerable number of the tradesmen, employed by him, actually prepared to march out to join the rebels. He expostulated with them in vain, they treated his advice and remonstrance with contempt and derision. He immediately returned to the Castle, and communicated to Mr. Marsden

this further intelligence, with all the eagerness and sensibility of a loyal man exposed to the pikes of assassins. His warning voice was again disregarded, and his intelligence again spurned with contempt, by the sagacious and magnanimous guardian of the Irish nation. Mr Clarke, returning home at a late hour in the evening, was way-laid and shot, as it is believed, by some of his own workmen. You now, with demonstration of the act before you, can scarcely believe that no one measure of precaution, of any kind, was taken for the safety of the Castle and City of Dublin, though there was ample time for this purpose after the information was given.—— The Castle was left to its ordinary guard, about 100 men, with the usual quantity of ammunition to each man. No supply of ball-cartridges was in readiness. The yeomanry were totally unapprized of their danger, and left without any supply whatever of ball-cartridges. When the lawyer's corps, between ten and eleven at night, rushed to the Castle, alarmed by the cries of murder and rebellion in the streets, the stores were opened, and no cartridges were to be found, except a few made up for carbines and pistols, and which were entirely unfit for musquets. In the Castle, all was terror, confusion, and dismay. The garrison in the barrack were in a similar state, without information, without preparation, and without orders. The principal officers, who, in the full security of peace, had been that day amusing themselves at a grand cricket match in the Park, afterwards dined at a Tavern in Earl Street, remote from their quarters, and remained there until a late hour of the night, having narrowly escaped assassination. Other officers walking through the streets on their different engagements, were told by some who had escaped, that the rebels were actually, at that instant, armed and in great force in Thomas Street, committing the most cruel outrages. They did not believe the intelligence, thinking it impossible that government should be so destitute of information, far less, that they should have received and neglected it. General Dunn, amidst this carnage and confusion, at length made his way from the barrack to the head-quarters at Kilmainham, through streets beset by armed rebels; and narrowly escaped assassination. There he received the first orders, which were issued to the military for the suppression of the rebels. They were promptly and gallantly executed. In short, so complete was the surprize, that the rebels advanced without opposition within two short streets of the castle, and nothing but their brutal ferocity, in attacking Lord Kilwarden, prevented them from taking it. Here let me pause, and ask how it was possible that a conspiracy, of this extent, so long in agitation, so diffused in its operation, could so long have been concealed from the Irish government? The people will ask, why no measures were taken for the apprehending Russell and Emmett, who were seen by many, and were long and pretty openly employed in maturing the conspiracy? The people will ask, why no proclamation has been issued, offering suitable rewards for apprehending these desperate miscreants, and the other leaders who are known, while rewards have been offered by a puny proclamation for bringing to punishment the deluded rabble who were but the instruments of their atrocity? The people well know the leaders are few, but their followers are numerous, and spring up like the soldiers of Cadmus. The punishment of these persons would cut up the conspiracy by the roots, the cutting off thousands of the latter would scarcely diminish the danger. Another measure appears to the people a little extraordinary. Many copies of the rebel proclamation have been taken while the rebels were in the very act of printing it, but are attempted to be most carefully suppressed by the Irish government. A printer of known loyalty applied at the Castle, for liberty to print and publish the Dublin proclamation from the provisionary government, with notes explanatory of its mischievous tendency, but was strictly enjoined on no account to attempt it. This reminds me of the school-boy who turns his face to the wall and thinks that nobody can see him. It is obvious that these proclamations cannot be kept concealed from rebels or enemies, why then keep them secret from the loyal part of the community, who, to a man, are mercilessly proscribed by them? For my part, so little do I think, that secrecy, as to any thing that has passed here for the last six months, can contribute to the public safety, that I am determined, by a deliberate sense of imperious duty, to make known, as far as I possibly can, to the Irish and British Public, the whole of what has been done and left undone during that period. My only object is the public safety, and my only means a strict adherence to truth. If a single position in this detail can be controverted, I am ready to expunge it. But I cannot compromise the safety of all for the paltry purpose of rescuing the guilty from public execration and the arms of justice. It is an awful question to be put by the people to those who have

had the guidance of public measures: who are *responsible* for the murder of Lord Kilwarden, the much lamented head of Irish jurisprudence? The blood of this unfortunate nobleman, of the hapless Colonel Brown, and the other ill-fated victims of rebellion, who were exposed to the pikes of merciless savages, by criminal supineness and the most obdurate obstinacy, cries aloud for vengeance. Small will be the atonement to their manes, that those who exposed them to the most ferocious of mankind should meet with the punishment they have richly merited. Had the measure of their crimes been completed, there would not, at this day, have been a loyal hand left in Ireland to hold a pen to detail to you, Sir, who were absent in a foreign realm, the dismal catastrophe of the annihilation of Ireland. As far as their guilt is concerned, they are answerable to the fullest extent for the destruction of the very name, character, and stamp of loyalty in this wretched and most neglected country. Ministers did no one act; they took no one measure to discover, prevent, resist, or suppress the mischief. If they did, let them name it, and so far diminish the load of their guilt. You may, Sir, readily conceive the feelings under which I write this horrid and detestable history of treason, audacious, active, and high-exerted treason; opposed to supercilious folly and wavering imbecility.——Let me advert, for a moment, to our present forlorn condition. In common with the rest of my countrymen, who feel and think, not a morning do I rise from my bed, but I expect to hear of a landing of the enemy in force on some part of the coasts of this kingdom. Mention to Mr. Marsden this general sentiment of the nation; nay, if one should come from the dead to announce it, *he* will receive it with the same supercilious grimace as he did the intelligence of Mr. Aylmer, Mr. Clarke, Mr. Going, Mr. Finlay, and many others, on the fatal 23d of July. The only measure I have heard of taken for our defence, is, that redoubtable act of policy, the re-embodying the Irish militia, a measure reprobated and deprecated by every thinking man in the nation. Ask Lord Hutchinson, whether the Irish militia can be relied on against French veteran troops. In short, the folly and temerity of this measure is next to madness, when their service is confined by law to the country where they have been already tried, and have been found fit only to fill the enemy's ranks. But, militia regiments were agreeable douceurs to the meritorious body of Irish gentry resorting to St. James's—and to that we are to be sacrificed: paltry, wretched, witless, infatuated men?

> "Haud tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis tempus eget."—

I hope; from the bottom of my soul I hope, that I may not be ominous, but I cannot help reflecting; it presses, it forces itself on my mind, that in every country, overwhelmed, during the latter period of French continental hostilities, you, Sir, were the British harbinger of their dismal overthrow and subjugation—witness Switzerland, Tuscany, and Austria. May God! that God, who has recently rescued us from the deadly lethargy of ministerial pride, ignorance, and presumption, avert the omen! Regular troops, tried veteran troops can alone adequately defend us, powerfully reinforced by a numerous, gallant, and loyal yeomanry. Such troops alone can repel the first attacks of the French. In this country, reverses at the out-set may be fatal, as they would be the means of bringing, instantaneously, myriads of armed rebels into the field. And yet, the present plan is to oppose French veteran troops with a raw, unofficered, incomplete Irish militia. Great Britain is fortifying her capital—read this letter, and say, what have the Irish ministers been doing?

Your indignant observer,

AN IRISHMAN.

ON INVASION.

SIR,—Since you published in your Register of the 10th ult. that part of my letter which relates to St. Domingo, accounts have reached this country, both from France and America, respecting the state of affairs in that island. The French, as might be supposed, speak most favourably of the situation of their troops there, and describe them as enjoying a certain degree of tranquillity; and, indeed, so it may be, if being shut up in the sea-port towns and receiving only such supplies of produce from the interior of the country as the blacks might think fit to give them, in return for the articles of necessity of which they themselves may stand in need, can be so considered. The Americans, however, represent things in a much worse light; yet, no doubt, in a more correct point of view. They say, that the French are not only shut up in the sea-port towns, but that they have failed in an attack which they made upon Tortue, and that a considerable number of French troops have deserted to the negro army. The case, however, appears to be simply this—

if our government do but take immediate and proper steps to open a communication with the black chieftains, in the manner, and under the stipulations * I have before pointed out, and declare all the ports of St. Domingo, now in the possession of French troops, in a state of blockade, the whole of the military force of France, in that island, would be under the necessity of surrendering to the blockading squadrons, or to the black armies. The supplies of flour and salt provisions which the French obtain from America (and which are the only supplies they have hitherto obtained) would be immediately cut off, and, as it is fair to presume that they have but very little in store, necessity would, before the expiration of six months, oblige them to submit. By the arrival of the *five* ships at Ferrol, the French naval force at St. Domingo is reduced to about *three* ships of the line and a few frigates, but these have also very probably left the island for Europe, otherwise there is little doubt that they must soon fall into our hands. The Consul being aware of the danger to which his fleet was exposed in that part of the world, not only from our squadrons, but from the critical state of St. Domingo, has very prudently withdrawn the greater part of it, and the remainder will undoubtedly very shortly be withdrawn, if they are not destined to make a trip to America, for provisions for the troops, before they ultimately depart for Europe, and abandon the soldiers to their fate.——The five French ships, which have lately arrived at Ferrol, are well situated to escort and protect any armaments that may be preparing, for the invasion of Ireland, in the Loire, the Charente, or the Garsone; and as Ireland is our vulnerable point, a strict and close blockade of Ferrol, Bordeaux, Rochfort, Rochelle, and Nantes is an object that claims our immediate and most particular attention; as any armaments that may be equipped for Ireland from those ports will unquestionably run 150 or 200 leagues to the westward before they attempt to steer a course for their real destination, as well with the view of avoiding our cruizers in the Bay of Biscay, as for the purpose of joining their ships, now at Ferrol, in a certain latitude, if they can put to sea and elude the vigilance of the squadron blockading that port.—The conquest of St. Lucia appears to have made no greater impression upon the minds of the people in this country than the capture of a single merchant vessel, although the strong post of Morne Fortunée was carried by our brave troops in the most gallant manner; it is, however, an evident proof of the decided superiority which our heroic countrymen have hitherto maintained, for ages, over the troops of our inveterate enemy, and shews what will be the fate of those who may have the temerity to invade our native land. But this success ought not to lead us to prosecute farther *military* operations against the colonies of France, for no good whatever is likely to result ultimately from such a system. Our ships should closely blockade all the ports of their islands, but our military operations should be confined entirely to Europe. In a former letter * I detailed pretty fully my ideas upon this subject, and before I conclude this letter I shall make a few more remarks thereon. We have now a sufficient military force in the West-Indies to hold St. Lucia and Tobago, and to secure all our own islands against any attack whatever. And by proper arrangement, there might be found a disposable force sufficient, also, to garrison the Dutch colonies in South America until peace shall be restored. For if we do not possess ourselves of them, the French at Cayenne will, in all probability, take them under their protection; and when once France is in possession of them there is not the least probability of their being restored.——The Cape of Good Hope having been so much the subject of conversation since the peace of Amiens, I cannot help expressing my apprehensions that it may be again an object of conquest in the contemplation of government. Should this be the case, not a man should be sent from Europe against it, but the whole military force for that particular service should be drawn from India.——I shall now revert to the observations I communicated to you upon the subject of invasion, which have not yet appeared in print; I shall, therefore, here repeat them in the expectation that you will give them a place in the ensuing Register.——I have, in a former letter, shewn the state of that part of the navy allotted for the defence of the country, for the protection of our coasting trade and navigation, and for the annoyance of that of France and Holland, and the blockade of their ports at the signing of the preliminary treaty; the force I have there enumerated, you are, of course aware, did not include the ships in the Mediterranean and on the coast of Spain, these amounted to 42 sail of the line (including troop-ships) 4 fifties, 62 frigates, and 39 sloops, in all, with the

* See Register, p. 33, *et seq.*

* See Register, p. 40.

ships armed en flute, 147 vessels of war. The naval force upon the more distant stations, I need not here mention, as that force cannot be considered at all connected with the subject of invasion, though the fleet in the Mediterranean and on the coast of Spain may fairly be brought into view, in the discussion of this topic.——A few months before the preliminary treaty of London was signed, Mr. Dundas (Lord Melville) in his speech on the 25th of March, 1801, in answer to Mr. Grey on the subject of the military force then in Great Britain and Ireland, said, "*There is at present of regular force in England, an establishment of* 21,500 *cavalry, and of* 84,900 *infantry: and in Ireland a regular cavalry of* 4,400 *men, and* 48,600 *infantry. This is exclusive of the artillery, exclusive of marines to the amount of about* 10,000, *serving on board ships of war on the home station; exclusive of sea-fencibles amounting to near* 7,000 *men; and exclusive of the volunteer force in both Islands. I am not possessed of an accurate statement of the volunteer force in Ireland, but I am generally informed that it amounts to about* 40,000. *In England, according to an examination very recently made of their effective strength, it amounts to* 20,685 *cavalry, and* 107,353 *infantry.*" By this statement of Mr. Dundas's it appears, that there was a total of regular and volunteer cavalry of 42,185, and of infantry 199,253, (exclusive of the 10,000 marines, which certainly ought to be omitted while serving afloat) making a general total, for the defence of Great Britain, of 241,438 men. The cavalry in Ireland, except the regular force, cannot be distinguished, but the general total including infantry and cavalry amounted to 93,000. So that the whole force in the United Kingdom was no less than 334,438 men in arms!! All of whom would, upon the landing of the French, and upon proclaiming martial law, have been liable to be marched from one extreme of the Kingdom to the other; yet, notwithstanding all this immense force, and the complete protection afforded thereby, the Consul's threats of invasion were re-echoed in the people's ears, instead of assaulting and destroying his towns upon the coast, and thereby rendering his government and his hostility to this country odious to his own people, who would then have soon been convinced that all his boasted threats against this country were vain, and that he was even incapable of securing them against our just revenge. My motive for going back to the period of which I have been speaking is, because every thing seems to shew that the same sentiments now pervade the government and the parliament, although we have a much more considerable armed force in the United Kingdom, than we had even at the period to which I have referred. May I therefore not be justified in saying, that there is not, I am confident, a professional man of experience and distinction, either in the navy or army, who would not join with me, in urging the immediate embarkation of 10,000 * men, or as many more as possible, for offensive operations, as the season in which embarkations and debarkations can be effected with ease and safety, will soon be past——The embarkation of such a force as I have here described, would of itself, agitate the whole of the sea-port towns of France, and would be the means of turning the troops which the Consul may have destined for the invasion of this country, to the defence of the French coast.——It was by such a system of proceeding in the years 1758 and 1759, as this I have here pointed out, that, that *immortal statesman* Mr. Pitt (Lord Chatham) raised this country to that pinnacle of glory and fame at which she arrived through his wisdom, assisted by the skill and conduct of our admirals and generals, and supported by the valour of our seamen and soldiers. At the period above-mentioned, the French held out threats similar to those of the present day, and preparations, upon the most extensive scale, were making in all the ports within the Channel to convey their troops to our shores. Shipping, flat-bottomed boats, and craft of all descriptions were collected for the purpose, and the whole of their men of war were ordered to assemble at Brest to protect and support the invading army, which amounted to near 70,000 men, who were put under the command of the Prince of Condé, aided by 40 other generals. This grand expedition was, however, entirely frustrated by the bombardment of some of the enemy's towns within the Channel, by the destruction of the shipping in their ports, and by attacking various points of their coast, by the defeat of the Toulon squadron by Admiral Boscawen on its way to Brest, for the purpose of strengthening the fleet there, and by the decisive victory obtained over M. Conflans by Sir Edward Hawke near Belleisle. These were amongst the glorious results of Mr. Pitt's profoundly wise and energetic administration. Yet when that great statesman resolved upon these vigorous measures, the whole military establishment of this country was

* Vide Register, Vol. IV. p. 41.

about 70,000 regulars and 30,000 militia, making a total of 100,000 men in arms. Now, by the vote of Parliament, the regular force is about 140,000, the militia of the United Kingdom 130,000, the army of reserve 50,000, and 280,000 volunteers are actually enrolled *, making the whole 600,000 men in arms, exclusive of a considerable body of sea-fencibles. To these are yet to be added the *levy en masse*. Nevertheless, are we sunk into, and kept upon a defensive system. How must this nation naturally feel then, upon comparing the decisive conduct pursued by Mr. Pitt, with the language now held in Parliament, where the threatened invasion is talked of as almost inevitable, and as a matter of course. What would the *illustrious Chatham* say, were it possible for him to hear the leading men in our legislature speak of the possibility of the enemy throwing 60,000 *men* into this country *without a fleet*, or even a squadron to protect them against the attack of a few frigates. It is true, that our naval armaments are not so numerous as could be wished, yet they are fully sufficient, at the present time, to blockade every port, at which the enemy *may be making preparations* to embark his troops: a perfect knowledge of which, may be obtained by the observations of our naval commanders, as well as by those channels through which intelligence may always be procured, when liberal rewards are held out for it.——Between the Elbe and Bayonne we have now 31 ships of three and two decks, 42 frigates, and 72 sloops (including inferior armed vessels) actually employed in the blockade of the ports of France and Holland (or of those in possession of French troops) and in the protection of our own coasts, making a total of 145 vessels of war †. In addition to these, there are near 90 others of different classes fitting and preparing for sea, many of which are nearly ready to proceed against the enemy; yet we seem to be daily alarmed by fishing boats, schuyts, and flat bottomed boats, which are now held up as objects of terror, and in which, we are told, that, in spite of our ships of war, the threatening host are to be conveyed to our shores; but how such vessels as these are to escape the vigilance of our squadrons, I am at a loss to conceive; and if they should not escape their vigilance, inevitable destruction must attend them. The fishing boats and schuyts it is well known (particularly the latter) could make little or no progress without wind, and, with wind, they could not possibly move without being discovered, and then only with a fair breeze could they proceed in the crowded and lumbered state in which they must be, supposing each vessel to contain 100 *men*, which seems to be the number allotted to them; but which I venture to assert is, upon the average, more by *one-third* than such vessels could receive. Supposing, however, that each vessel could convey across the Channel 100 men, it would require no less than *six hundred* of these vessels to transport 60,000 men; but if my estimate be right, it would of course require more than *nine hundred*. Now I would ask any naval officer of experience, whether it be possible for an *hundred* of these vessels, nay, even for *twenty* of them, much less nine hundred, or even six hundred, as above stated, to leave the ports of France, Flanders, and Holland, without being discovered, and consequently destroyed. It is right here to observe, that in speaking of the comparatively small number of *twenty* vessels, I allude to those ports at which it is understood preparations are making for embarkations, and before which our blockading squadrons are stationed: I would not on any account, for a moment, entertain such an idea of the want of vigilance, of zeal, of activity, and of ability in such officers as Admiral Thornbrough, Sir James Saumarez, and Sir Sydney Smith, as to imagine that, any one of these gallant and distinguished men, would suffer even so small a number as twenty of the vessels before described to escape, having been apprized, that, in the port before which his squadron was placed, such a flotilla was preparing for the invasion of his country. How then can any man, at all conversant with the movements of flotillas, and the transport of troops, be so absurd as to think that *one, two, three, six, or nine hundred vessels*, lumbered with men, could not only put to sea without being discovered, but absolutely reach the British shores in defiance of our naval commanders, and of our brave and gallant seamen No;—This I declare to be impossible! and I have no doubt, that this declaration would be readily confirmed upon an appeal to the distinguished men I have alluded to, as well as by all others in the service, animated with the like zeal and spirit of enterprize. For, our blockading squadrons, at this season of the year, are perpetually, either collectively or separately, at the mouths of the enemy's

* The yeomanry and volunteers in Ireland have not been stated, though it is imagined, their numbers now exceed considerably what Mr. Dundas supposed them to be (40,000) when he made his speech in March, 1803.

† There are in the Mediterranean also near 50 ships of war of different rates.

ports, both day and night; consequently, not a single vessel can move by day, without being seen even in port; how then is *one hundred* or more of these vessels, even in the night, to come out of the harbours before which our ships are so closely placed, without being discovered by our commanders? Or, how indeed, could *one hundred* or more of these vessels, crowded with soldiers, leave their own ports after dark, even supposing our ships were not immediately in the way to oppose their departure? Would they not run foul of each other or get on shore, and consequently fall into the utmost confusion before they could clear the harbour's mouth? And, if they took a moon-light night for the purpose, they would be almost as soon discovered by our ships as by day. Until the equinox our squadrons may constantly be kept close upon the enemy's shores, and during and after that period they have only to take a little offing when the wind blows on the enemy's coast, as the flotillas must be kept stationary as long as an adverse wind blows; and when the wind is from off the enemy's shore, and favourable to the movements of their flotillas, our ships will of course be always the more secure against the element the nearer they are to the land. When the wind is westerly, the boats of each blockading squadron will keep rather to windward of the object of its attention, and when the wind is to the eastward they will then take a similar station, by which an entire command of each port would always be preserved.——It should also, be observed, that, whenever the wind is fair for the enemy to approach our coasts, the surf is, in consequence, so great upon the shores, that, without any opposition being made to the landing of his troops, the attempt would be liable to great hazard, if it were not even frustrated.——Various means of defence against invasion have been devised, amongst which, in the autumn of 1798, when we were told that *rafts*, in addition to every means now resorted to, were preparing to invade us, there was one of an entirely novel, but of a most important kind, projected by the then Board of Admiralty. It was this, vessels of a certain description were collected in the Downs, filled with stones and other materials for the purpose of being scuttled and sunk at the entrance of Goree, in order to shut up the navigation of the port; and this would undoubtedly have been effected, had the vessels, instead of being dispatched from the Downs, been sent directly from Yarmouth, which is immediately opposite to Helvoet, and only ninety miles from it. Unfortunately, however, the season being far advanced before the attempt was made, and the vessels meeting with strong and contrary winds on their voyage from the Downs, the object was defeated. This circumstance should not, however, prevent a renewal of the attempt against Goree, and against all such other ports, where the entrances may be in any degree similar, either on the coasts of Holland, of Flanders, or of France. In many instances it would be a most effectual system of defence, and would confound and annoy our enemies beyond description.—— While I am speaking on the subject of defence, I think it will not be amiss to observe, that, besides the ships employed upon the enemy's coasts for the blockade of their ports, we have a number of ships upon our own coasts, stationed at different points where the enemy may be expected to make his attempt, under the denomination (which you so much admire) of block-ships. These ships should all, if they are not already provided with them, be supplied with strong fire booms, high boarding nettings, and a quantity of hand-granades; a couple of artillery men, acquainted with the art of throwing hand-granades, should be put on board each of the block-ships. It might not be amiss also, to supply all our blockading squadrons, particularly those within the Channel, with hand-granades, which would have a most destructive effect when thrown into *open boats* or *small craft*; and every ship or vessel appointed to defensive operations, should constantly lie, when at anchor, whith springs upon their cables, by which they would be instantly enabled to bring their broadsides to bear upon any object that might approach, without any regard to wind or tide.——Having already pointed out the difficulties the enemy must have to encounter before he can reach our shores, and enumerated the immense armed force we have to oppose him, should he ever, contrary to any belief founded on common sense and reason, effect a landing in this country; I have no hesitation in saying, that offensive operations should be commenced against him without delay. There are many parts of the French coast, which might be attacked by 10,000 British soldiers, with a certainty of success; for whilst the enemy is drawing the invading army into Holland, Flanders, and the adjacent departments, several points must be exposed, and vulnerable to such a force as that abovementioned. The nation is now thoroughly roused and prepared to meet the enemy, yet offensive operations would tend still further to animate the people, and diffuse a military

ardour throughout the realm, by calling to our recollection the martial deeds of our brave ancestors. It is a duty also, which we owe to ourselves and to our posterity, to punish our inveterate and insolent foe, threatening us at once with plunder, devastation, and destruction. By undertaking some offensive operation before the approach of winter, the great expense and personal sacrifices made by the people would be more chearfully borne, and the nation would be led to contemplate the glorious exploits of the ensuing year, when we shall have at least 60,000 disposeable regular troops to open the campaign and to invade our enemy's coast. We shall besides, have by that time a fleet equal, if, unfortunately, circumstances should render it necessary, to cope with the whole marine of Europe.——I have only one more observation to make before I close this letter, which is, that, while the bounties are increased in every branch of the military service, the bounties for seamen remain exactly as they have been for years. I should therefore hope, that for a limited time, the bounties for able seamen would be increased to *ten* guineas; for ordinary seamen to *six*, and for landmen to *four*.——In corroboration of the opinions which I entertain upon the subject of invasion, I shall, for the present, only beg to call your attention to the sentiments Buonaparté avowed to Lord Whitworth on the 21st February last, in conversation with his Lordship, in which Buonaparté said, that, "as a proof of his desire to maintain peace, "he wished to know what he had to gain "by going to war with England. A de- "scent was the only means of offence he "had; and that he was determined to at- "tempt, by putting himself at the head of "the expedition. But, how could it be "supposed, that after having gained the "height on which he stood, he would risk "his life and reputation in such a hazardous "attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, "when the chances were that he and the "greatest part of the expedition would go "to the bottom of the sea. He talked "much on this subject, but never affected "to diminish the danger. He acknow- "ledged that there were one hundred "chances to one against him; but still he "was determined to attempt it, if war "should be the consequence of the present "discussion; and that such was the dispo- "sition of the troops, that army after army "would be found for the enterprize."——Whether Buonaparté actually thought the odds against the success of his boasted and rash attempt were so great as he stated them to be to Lord Whitworth, I cannot pretend to say, but of this I am certain, that if, after reading the above, any man will only make use of his reason, he will easily convince himself that the Consul could not be much out in his calculation.——I am, Sir, yours, and a Friend to my Country.

13*th July*, 1803.

TO THE RT. HON. H. ADDINGTON, &c.

SIR,——His Majesty having, by his gracious favour, placed you at the head of his councils, your opinions derive from that situation a degree of authority, as well as a facility of circulation which would not belong to them in your capacity of an individual.—It follows as a necessary consequence, that it is your duty to be unwearied in the inquiries, and earnest in exerting the whole powers of the mind to form those opinions on the soundest and most clear foundation; always recollecting that you are deeply responsible to your country for every failure in the above most important duty, directly arising from your situation, and that the public will be the sufferer from your errors or indiscretion.——It is in the character of an individual of this public, who conceives, that we are affected in our most delicate rights by some principles advanced, and warmly supported by you in the debates on the Property-Bill, that I now address you.—You have, in the debates alluded to, distinctly maintained the following position, as a principle by which your conduct, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, might be correctly regulated in the important duty of taxation; namely, "that in the imposition of a ge- "neral tax on property, a distinction in "point of rate might be made in taxing "property of different kinds:" and to carry this opinion into effect, the Property Bill introduced by you, subjected the proprietors of land and interest in the funds, under a certain value, to a heavy rate of taxation, from which the mercantile interest were either wholly exempted, or relieved according to various degrees of abatement.——I shall not enter into or repeat the abstruse and metaphysical reasoning drawn from the writers on political œconomy, by which you and the Attorney General attempted to justify a measure, which the common-sense of mankind (who most fortunately have not read these books) will pronounce to be unjust and absurd; I choose rather to prove to you and the learned gentleman, the folly and danger of making distinctions between different kinds of property at all, by a sort of reasoning which will create no other feeling

in those plain men, who understand it, than that of surprise, that any arguments, much less metaphysical arguments, could have convinced the Attorney General, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.——To put the question in a clear and practical point of view; if I should ask you, Sir, or any man of common sense or justice in the kingdom, do you respect the rights of proprietors? Are you willing to give property your protection? Your answer would, no doubt, be in the affirmative.——Now, Sir, if you examine the operations of your own mind, and the plain practical feeling that dictates the answer, you will find that this avowal of respect for property, this declaration of a readiness to protect it, is a sentiment that does not admit of degrees or qualification; it is subject to no mental reservation or technical distinction; it is, on the contrary a general assent to a general proposition, without degrees, qualification, distinction, or reservation.—But, Sir, though this is plain, yet you propose to levy a tax on the land-holder and stock-holder, from which you are of opinion that the merchant should be exempt——I would ask, is this in conformity with the principle above described? Do you in making this proposition of an "unequal" tax, "equally" respect and protect every species of property? Or rather, do you not in practice, in this very important instance, adopt a scale of degrees in the respect and protection you are disposed to give to property?—But you will here be forward to detail your lesson of metaphysico political œconomy, and your grounds of distinction between this and that species of property.—I shall not repeat what you have said, or anticipate what you may say; but rather ask you, is there no danger in all this? Are you quite sure, that in every future period, every man will make the precise distinctions, or that every man will agree in the same scale of degrees which you have proposed?—Are you so certain, that your reasonings are so mathematically correct that no future speculator will venture to substitute another set of visionary speculations, and a new scale, in the place of your visions and your scale, and may not the human passions of envy and avariee interfere in the dispute and convert "*all your theories*" and "*the practice*" of oppression and plunder?—I confess this, I have, at times, felt an inclination to hear your speculations on this subject with mere pleasantry and laughter; but I recollect, that we have lived to see times that make the indulgence of abstract speculation no subject for jest or sportiveness of the imagination.——We all know, that a very few years have passed since the general pillage of all owners of property took place in an unfortunate neighbouring country.—The very first step in this tragedy was, that of making invidious distinctions between different species of property, and this on grounds just as fallacious and absurd as those advanced on the authority of the Attorney General, and of you, Sir, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer.——Yet, notwithstanding the weakness of the reasons, the whole property of the clergy in France was subject to general confiscation.—The greater part of the rights of the land holders was abolished, and their property arbitrarily confiscated: the ultimate conclusion was pretty sweeping and general; universal proscription was issued against all proprietors by the most absurd and inflammatory declamations against "the aristocracy" of wealth. The first step throughout this nefarious transaction was the use of plausible theories to mark out one species of proprietors as the object of plunder, their title was questioned on loose and indefinite grounds, the band of property, thus weakened, order after order, proprietor after proprietor, were proscribed and pillaged, till the leading feature of property, "*security of pos-*" "*session,*" was annihilated.——You will be forward to say these are extreme cases, and cannot apply to the subject in question: my answer is this; they are historical facts which have been produced by visionary speculators, who have either been deluded themselves by writers, whose works, I conclude, you have read, or who deluded others for the most nefarious purposes.——I might end my argument here; but, independently of the general principle, various considerations concur in strengthening my position of the propriety of adhering to the simple rule of equal and undistinguished taxation of the different owners of different species of property.——We are now engaged in a war which will certainly require the unanimous and cordial co-operation of all persons in the kingdom, to bring it to a conclusion on terms which will secure the safety, honour, and independence of the country.——Now, Sir, the obvious and certain effect of making this invidious distinction between different proprietors, (a distinction which you most fortunately were unable to establish,) was to weaken the band of union among them, and to establish a petty rivalry and jealousy between the gentlemen of the landed and commercial interests.——If your project had been carried into effect, or even had it been longer contested, this consequence would inevitably have followed.—Nay, to a

certain extent, this rivalry and jealousy was beginning to take root; the danger was at its first stage, theories were discussed, and distinctions were contended for, on the one side, and denied on the other; thus the end of their struggle could not have been beneficial to either party, even you must admit; for my part, I conceive, that it might have naturally led to disunion, fraud, and violence.——But, Sir, if your principle in itself leads to all these mischievous consequences, the mode of carrying it into effect was peculiarly calculated to accelerate the period of their arrival. If I understand the question correctly; "all income arising from the "mercantile transactions and capital, was "exempted from taxation if under £60 per "annum, and entitled to various degrees of "abatement from the general tax when un-"der £150. At the same time all income "derived from land or the public funds, "was subject to taxation from the lowest "sum without either exemption or abate-"ment."——Now, Sir, I must suppose you wholly ignorant of the whole of actual and common life, if you do not know, that, of all descriptions of men, the very poorest are the small annuitants deriving their subsistence from funded property, and the small land proprietors. Men of the latter description are, also, extremely numerous, as you might have been informed by the members for Yorkshire, Wales, and some of the western counties.——Do you think, that these persons smarting under a tax, from which their mercantile neighbour was exempt, would not have felt the most severe discontent, and that feeling it then would not have loudly expressed it?——You may be assured this would have been the immediate effect.—You will perhaps, recollect (though it sometimes occurs that you forget what you have openly and deliberately said) that you have distinctly described the whole of the late burthens as "war-taxes." Now, if any such tax should become odious from the injustice, folly, or partiality, of its imposition, I think, I may, from the constitution and frame of the mind of man, and from the nature of his passions, assume, that the period would not be distant when the war itself, supported by such taxes, whose duration is limited by its continuance, would become unpopular.—I beg you would for a moment reflect (and the experience of the peace of Amiens will assist your reflections,) what would be the consequence of your being obliged again to make a disastrous and disgraceful peace or truce, (call it which you will,) by the clamour and discontent of the country.—I say again, "obliged," for you have uniformly thrown on the people of England, the odium and disgrace of compelling you to sign this piece of parchment called the Treaty of Amiens; but, whether justly or unjustly, I shall not now inquire.—Sir, I conclude this address to you with a serious request, that you would not hereafter depend on the writers on political œconomy, for principles to guide you in the practical work of taxation.—I would, also, guard you against metaphysical arguments, as not being fitted for practical use. Very few are there who can resort to them for assistance without danger.—You may possibly have heard of a weapon of offence, (not the rustic implement) called a "flail," in the hands of a man of strong arm, cool head, and correct eye, it affords of all modes of attack the most effectual and destructive; but place it in the hand of the feeble, the timid, or the short sighted, and its force will inevitably fall on the head of such a man if he presumes to use it, and heavy will be the fall thereof. Pray Sir, remember the concluding advice contained in this allusion.—I am, your most obedient servant,

AN OWNER OF PROPERTY.

TO THE EARL OF SUFFOLK.

MY LORD,——At a crisis so important, so momentous as the present, every nobleman should follow the praise-worthy example set by your Lordship, in recommending, to our Gracious Sovereign, measures best calculated to defeat the intentions, and render abortive the attempts of our presumptuous and enterprising enemy. The plan, which has been recommended by your Lordship, of constituting a field-commission for the purpose of planning, digesting, and even executing projects for our own security, and the annoyance of the enemy, is a measure which must meet the entire approbation of every friend of his country. It is a well known fact, my Lord, to every private in his Majesty's army, that *many* of our generals are too little acquainted with active, and actual service; are untried men, and have not the ability to surmount unexpected difficulties. The soldier, in the ranks, feels elated with sanguine hope, or depressed with melancholy apprehensions, in proportion as he admires the services, or despises the ignorance and inexperience of his general, or immediate commanding officer; their hopes of success, or fears of failure, are generally built on the character and known conduct of their leader; and these are communicated from one to the other without caution or reserve. I am, my Lord, a sol-

dier of a few years standing, (8) but, in that time, I have been very actively employed in the duties of my profession, and am pretty well acquainted with the habits, dispositions, temper, and ideas of the privates of the army, from whom an officer, much among them, will frequently hear, that "such an officer is a very gallant man, but "no general. Such another will lead us "into action, but knows not how to lead us "out. Such a man has never seen ser- "vice, and how can he conduct us advan- "tageously? Perhaps, to shew his courage, "we must all be cut to pieces, because he is "inexperienced." On a march, my Lord, men must talk, and very often in terms of dissatisfaction. Men will judge, will think, and will speak. Ask the 52d what they thought, and still think, of their Ferrol excursion; they will answer, "we feel dis- "graced by our leader; had Moore, Mon- "son, or any one under whom we were "accustomed to serve in India been our "leader, with the power to act, we should "have acted as gloriously as we have acted "in India." A raw recruit soon learns from the old soldier, the character and ability of his general or commanding officer, and he is easily lead to adopt, with juvenile ardour, the opinion of the veteran. With what enthusiasm are some names mentioned by them! The undrilled recruit feels elated, when Beard, Hutchinson, Abercrombie, and his not less gallant and admired brother, Robert Abercrombie, are named. He has learnt, and firmly believes, that these men are conquerors, that they know how to fight, and how to beat an enemy. Under these men, or those who are known to have possessed their confidence, to have aided their efforts, to have distinguished themselves under them, and to have received their public and unqualified approbation, soldiers, my Lord, are ever ready and able to perform acts of heroism. But, in our service, unfortunately, interest and not merit, carries every thing. When a general assumes a command, the natural and general questions which soldiers ask each other, which one regiment inquires of another, are, "Where has he been on service? Who did "he fight under? Did he beat or was he "beaten? Is he an old soldier, or has he "got on by his purse and his friends?" The name of old soldier, sounds even to the recruit, like the name of brother, father, and friend. How much must, consequently, depend upon the mere reputation of a general or leader? It is not in St. James's-street, or at the Horse-guards, that officers learn the art of war; there, it is true, they obtain notice, patronage, and lucrative employments: and with tolerable interest in that quarter, a man may acquire (from being out of the army entirely, and after never having been more than a captain in the army, and a commissary of ordnance) the rank of Lieut. Colonel, and a snug command, (a fit reward for an old and needy soldier,) followed by another very good appointment. There are many useful and valuable officers, who have never quitted the service, and who might reasonably expect, and look for such rewards after a long and toilsome life, in the service of their country; and it is the misapplication of these rewards, that tends greatly to undermine, and will eventually ruin our military service; I have often heard it remarked, that the very numerous *new* regulations made by our superior, only operated to the prejudice of the poor, and were all easily surmounted by the rich; under such an idea, men never will serve with zeal, activity, and diligence, and it is greatly to be regretted, that such really is the case. At the commencement of a new war, it is certainly necessary for the good of his Majesty's service, that officers of every rank and description, should have *ample* reason to feel assured, that their services will not only be remembered, but be rewarded, without the aid of interest, or influence of money. The circle in which patronage, employment, emolument, and rank are confined, does not embrace very many of our most able, and most deserving officers. It is the duty, my Lord, of every true, every *manly* patriot, (of your Lordship's consequence,) to adopt an unconfined, steady, and discriminating attention to, and support of, merit in our officers. In such a free country as this, noblemen have the power of recommending to his Majesty such of his subjects as deserve his notice, and our Sovereign is known to possess a desire to reward services in a flattering manner; but, my Lord, there are persons possessed of diffident and modest merit, men who complain only in private, men who disdain to solicit favours, but are ever ready to offer, and afford services. These are the men fit to be employed. Take the pains, my Lord, to scrutinize the list of generals, and brigadier-generals, now employed on the staff, inquire into their qualifications for such distinction; ask where, when, and how they have served his Majesty? Do not confine your inquiry merely to those in Great-Britain, extend it to Ireland, to Scotland, and even in India; you will meet with objectionable characters, not in Baird, Stewart, Wellesley, or M'Dowall. These are distinguished characters worthy of any and every distinction which their country can confer on them.—

But, my Lord, at such a time as the present, it is absolutely necessary, that in the selection of officers to command armies in defence of our country, constitution, liberty, and religion, no partiality (but for eminent abilities and distinguished services), should be shewn to particular interests or court favour. The stake is too material, too important to be trusted to raw and untried generals. The guards, my Lord, have been spoken of as brave troops, and as such are entitled to the commendations of every soldier, but let us not forget that their services have been very limited, and that every insignificant achievement performed by them, has always found its way into public prints in language the most flowery, and the most flattering from the most partial authority.—The guards, my Lord, are not superior, if equal to our troops of the line, their officers are gallant men, but not exclusively entitled to royal favour and patronage. The zeal of our officers can alone be kept alive by the impartial administration of honours. Men are easily disgusted, and when displeased are ready to enumerate every accidental or premeditated act of injustice with asperity and warmth; their sentiments are not confined to themselves or their confidential friends, they are the topic of conversation among every class, and, in proportion as their characters are esteemed, the stigmas, and loud censures, not only of their intimates, but of the country at large, are bestowed on the author of such injustice. Is it not, my Lord, the subject of conversation throughout this kingdom, why, or how, so many, so *great* a proportion of our general staff should be taken from the guards, when officers of much greater pretensions are left unnoticed, idle, and unemployed? Every respectable farmer feels the present, a war for the defence of all that is dear to him in life, and feels, consequently, an interest in knowing that the officers who are honoured with commands, are men, not only of indisputable courage, and great abilities, but of experience and knowledge in the art of war. They naturally say, our existence is at stake, we require, and must have men at our head who have served in various quarters, and who are, at least, equal to French generals. We must not have men only accustomed to retreat, or whose personal courage seems their only recommendation. This is the language, my Lord, of those who have a just detestation of a French yoke. But, before I conclude, give me leave to point out to your Lordship one or two late acts which give general disgust. The staff of general officers is composed of *more* than *three-fourths* from the *guards*. The establishment of the line, field-officers have been fixed at one Lieut. Colonel and two Majors, by which the Lieutenants in the guards have evidently a very great advantage over Captains in the army, by being able to arrive at the rank of Lieut. Colonel by regular succession, *much sooner* than the Captains of other corps, this is deemed a flagrant act of injustice. Again, the senior lieutenants of the guards have been allowed to raise only *thirty* men for the rank of *Lieut. Colonel*, whereas the senior Lieutenants of other regiments have to raise the same quota for the rank of *Captain*. Is not this, my Lord, a stretch of partiality too liable to give umbrage? Further, the *guards* who served in Egypt, and who never performed any *very memorable* exploit, is the *only* corps for whom his Majesty's permission has been obtained to wear their Turkish medals; is this not an invidious and disgusting mark of distinction? What do the troops who served in that quarter say? Why, my Lord, they condemn any limited act of favour, where all were *equally* worthy of notice. In the army we hate *pet* regiments, we wish, and expect from a Commander in Chief liberality and justice; from him we hope for encouragement and rewards as we merit them, not according to our interest with the individuals who compose his family. We allow a certain latitude to their influence, but we wish our Commander in Chief to act from his own ideas of justice and propriety, and not merely to limit his favours to their friends, or needy relations; this, my Lord, has been too much the case, and has lead the most respectable of our officers to fear, that H. R. H. has no opinion of his own, and is totally subservient to the advice and recommendation of a few artful and interested persons. It has been alleged as an accusation against the gallant Lord Hutchinson, that his Lordship was deficient in not applying for his Majesty's permission, for all the officers who composed his army to wear their medals; and, that Gen. Ludlow made such an application for the guards, which was accorded. Now, my Lord, does it not appear to your Lordship, as well as to the army at large, that this mark of Royal grace ought to have been solicited for the whole army by the Commander in Chief, as a mark of his approbation of their services, and consequently, a flattering compliment as well to Lord Hutchinson, as to every officer who served in Egypt? I am clearly of opinion, that such ornaments are more pleasing to officers of the guards than those of the line. At St. James's, a medal given by the Grand Seignior has attractions, which in the *field* are despised. It is an ornamental part

of dress which adds no sort of consequence to the wearer but at a levee or in a drawing room. But, my Lord, what value would have been attached to this paltry ornament, had H. R. H. (without an unbecoming solicitation from any quarter,) considered it his duty to those gallant officers of the army of Egypt, to make an application to his Majesty for them to wear such medals, as had been given by the Turkish Monarch in testimony of his sense of their merits, and to publish such Royal permission in the strongest terms of merited approbation? The army is, as your Lordship well knows, composed of men of the nicest, and most honourable feelings; men equally alive to praise or insult; men emulous to obtain the one, or ready to resent the other. The evil to be expected from such a marked and invidious partiality to the guards, is not, perhaps, so evident to H. R H. as to every experienced officer in the service. They must be kept distinct from other corps, or broils, discord, and duels will ensue. And your Lordship is aware that these feuds will not be confined to the officers of corps, there is, my Lord, an "esprit de corps" existing in the bosom of every private in his Majesty's army, a spirit which it would be highly impolitic to extinguish. A spirit which once destroyed will reduce our army to a mere mercenary, and, I may add, despicable force. Every regiment in the line, must and will feel a great degree of jealousy towards the guards, and it will be their pride and amusement to ridicule and undervalue their services; to dispute and deny their pretensions to that extreme degree of favour and affection which is shewn to them; and in doing this, my Lord, is it possible to avoid censures on the person who bestows such mortifying partiality? The true and real sentiments of the army will never reach his Royal Highness, unless your Lordship or some other independent nobleman, should point them out to him. And indeed, my Lord, you are of too exalted a rank to be made acquainted with their opinions, but through the medium of an anonymous letter. The great are generally in the dark, until the clouds burst and inundation ensues. His Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, could not have foreseen the insurrection at Gibraltar, although he studies his profession, and endeavours to form just notions of military duty. Governor Johnston is reckoned a sensible man, and yet he was not aware of the mutiny of his own regiment. Indeed, my Lord, great dissatisfaction has been given by innumerable acts of decided partiality to particular regiments. The army is naturally tenacious of justice, "jealous of honour," and easily offended.—And now, my Lord, give me leave to make a suggestion, which, in my mind, seems of most material consequence for the safety of Ireland. The papers some time past, stated a plan of exchanging the Irish Militia for the English, a measure which would have given a great proof of consummate wisdom in our ministers, but, my Lord, that measure has never been carried into effect, a measure which every man accustomed to the Irish, and acquainted with the sentiments of that class, which is enlisted into the Militia, must ardently desire. The nobility of Ireland are ignorant, or pretend to be so, of the defection of their countrymen; they grossly misrepresent their sentiments, and ridiculously imagine that a total change has taken place in their ideas, because they are too artful to avow those principles which, at present, they have not the means of vindicating and asserting; believe me, my Lord, nothing can render that country secure but an exchange of the Militia of both countries. In England, or abroad, the Irish make good soldiers, but their family connexions and original dislike to a Protestant Government, will render them infinitely more formidable to this kingdom than to a French army.——And, indeed, my Lord, I will venture to *assert* that there are many *regiments of the line* now in Ireland which ought to be removed to this country, if we have the least fear of an invasion of that island. Many, my lord, have been recruited in Ireland, and are full of those men who were once in arms against the beloved Sovereign now on the throne of this country. Many have been there sufficiently long to have married, and contracted intimacies and friendship with the disaffected part of that community. Some of our corps, most complete, are principally composed of men, whose dispositions I will not characterize. In Ireland, where liquor is so easily obtained, and where the people are ready, and studious to corrupt their principles by every insinuating attention, soldiers are easily seduced from their duty and allegiance. The regiments which have been two or three years in Ireland ought certainly to be relieved without loss of time by corps from England; the danger would be much less of an association between corps just arrived in that country, with the disaffected Irish, than with those who have wives, brothers, and near connexions among them, whose influence may greatly tend to their seduction. The guards, my lord, being considered as troops most *incorruptible*, and certainly bound to do more than the regiments of the line, from the partiality

and affection shewn them, ought to be sent to that country for two or three years. This would give them some claim to that affection so greatly displayed on every occasion; it would reconcile the army in some degree to that conspicuous notice which is paid to them; and it would eventually be of great service to them. provided they were placed under the command of some veteran and able generals. Not men of their own corps, or of the horse guards, or of light dragoons, or men who have only witnessed our defeat on the Continent. There are, my lord, but FEW generals of *experience* and tried ability in that Kingdom. There are as few on this side the water. What then must be our hopes if the French are fortunate in effecting a landing, under the protection of men who know not the range of a piece of cannon the advantages of position, the most skilful method of fighting, or how to defeat the purposes and intentions of an artful and warlike foe? Much must depend on the ability and talents of a general conducting an army against a desperate and enterprising enemy. Against able, brave, experienced, and active generals. It is not only necessary to oppose force to force, *skill* must be opposed to *skill*, and in the latter, my lord, I greatly fear the French will possess an *important* and material advantage. They will be commanded by men who have been accustomed to meet and to surmount difficulties, to defeat as much by their talents and ingenuity as the force of their arms; the vivacity of their minds readily places before them an artful method of deceiving, of misleading, and eventually of discomfiting our gallant, but inapt and inexperienced countrymen. Sagacity is acquired by experience in the field, which the French possess in an eminent degree, and against which the most noble courage will occasionally fail. These considerations will, I trust, induce your lordship and every patriotic peer to make inquiry into the military characters of those in whose hands our safety and security is placed; to find out the proper officers fit and able to oppose the abilities of the French, and to recommend them to his Majesty's notice. In acting thus, my lord, you will receive the approbation of the whole Kingdom, you will be admired as a true patriot, you will be beloved as a real Englishman, and you will be considered as the most useful defender of all that is dear to your countrymen. Let not personal attachment or partiality influence your conduct, take a comprehensive view of *all* who have proved useful to the state, who have evinced merit, and possess abilities as soldiers; let your selection be such that the character of every individual can stand the test of minute inquiry or investigation. This, my lord, your own existence as a peer, your fortune, your safety, your country, and religion demand. All these may be lost by a want of talents in our commanders: all may fall a sacrifice to their ignorance: all be transferred to French mastery, by their folly. It is a great, a momentous, a critical period! The country requires the exertion of talent and abilities. Much may be dreaded when 28 general officers are taken from the Guards out of 32, when interest is allowed to influence the conduct of government, and when ability and experience are so evidently wanting in those who are entrusted with important commands. Exert yourself, my lord, to rouse every peer from that state of lethargy, and of fatal security into which they seem to be lulled. The country will bless you, and you will attract the admiration of the world. A. B.

P. S. How, my lord, do all our able officers grumble at the contents of the late Gazettes! Who, my lord, are the men entitled to regiments? Old and distinguished officers, sufficiently active in body or mind to serve their King and Country effectually. Where, my lord, did Colonel Vansittart see service? At the Cape!!!!! And by holding an inactive command in the West-Indies!!! How far does his abilities soar above those of officers who served in Egypt or in India? The oratorial talents of Colonel Maitland are known within and without the walls of the House of Commons, but is he is eminent for his conduct without the walls of the fortress that protects the entrance to Ferrol? Which, my lord, is most essential in a soldier, the epistolary art, or the art of war? The name of the Earl of Cavan is but little known to military men. His untried abilities may hereafter justify the choice of H. R. H.—Is it not a mortifying circumstance to find Col. Durham distinguished by the command of a regiment. For what? for raising a fencible corps from which, it is well known, great emolument was gained, and for serving in Ireland!!!! This, my lord, is a sore cut on the army—that fencible officers should be introduced among us, not at the bottom, but at the *top* of our profession. The very privates of the army feel and consider fencible officers as inferior to, and a distinct class from, the officers of the line. They ought to be so. The spirit of the army will be broken if it is not so. We shall expect with despondency to be perpetually superceded by that species of soldiers accustomed to home service only. Pray, my lord, is our

list of colonels so deficient in able and active officers as to render it necessary, decent, or proper to bring Colonel Stapleton or Lord Roden in among us? Or are their talents or services so transcendently conspicuous as to impose an obligation to confer distinction and rank on them? This, my lord, is a severe and open censure on our colonels—perhaps there may be terror in their names which the French have learnt to dread. If these things occur, adieu to all zeal, all emulation, all desire for rank, when a gallant and experienced officer may suddenly find himself superceded or commanded by an heterogeneous animal who has been of all other trades before he tries soldiering. All upstart officers are obnoxious to the army. We wish for men who have entered on our profession at an early period, and have *steadily persevered* in the duties of a soldier. Not such as by Court favour have made a traffic, a mere *mercantile* profession of our service. How would a captain of one of our ships of war gaze with confusion and astonishment should he receive an order from the Admiralty to make a *landsman* steer his ship into action! Or should he receive as a lieutenant on board his ship a man who never saw the sea. How then, my lord, must the army wonder to see men brought in among us who are only conspicuous for having raised regiments, much to their own profit and gain! Men placed at the helm of a regiment, without having served a regular apprenticeship in the different gradations of our service! How mortifying, how disgusting, how *vexatious* are these circumstances to all zealous, steady, and able officers!

LOUISIANA.

Proclamation of the Spanish Intendant at New Orleans, for restoring to the Americans the right of Deposit at that Town.

It is hereby made known that his most excellent Sir Don Pedro Ceballos, Secretary of State, &c. has forwarded to me under date of the 1st of March past, the following royal order:—"The King being informed of the edict that you have published, prohibiting the deposit of the goods, the effects of the citizens of the United States, granted to that nation by the 22d article of the treaty of 1795, his Majesty has thought fit to order, that you permit the said deposit in New Orleans, without prejudice to what the two governments may agree upon between themselves, respecting the construction to be given to the said treaty in what relates to changing the establishment of New Orleans, for another on the borders of the Mississippi, in order that the depositing of the merchandize and effects of the United States be fulfilled—which I communicate to you by royal order, for its more punctual performance on your part."—And whereas the edict of the 16th October last past, which prohibited the introduction and depositing of the merchandize and effects of the citizens of the United States, until the Intendancy should receive express orders from the King, to authorize its continuance, is hereby become null and void, and without force.—Given at New Orleans, the 17th May, 1803, under my hand, and countersigned by the notary of royal finance.

Juan Ventura Morales.

Letter from the Governor General of Louisiana to the Governor General of the Mississippi territory.

Most Excellent Sir,——As the smallest circumstance respecting this important subject is so interesting to the general satisfaction and tranquillity of our respective governments, I take the particular pleasure in communicating to your Excellency, that yesterday at twelve o'clock, one hour after the arrival of the courier, the deposit for American merchandize and effects was restored, and put on the footing it formerly stood.

God preserve your Excellency many years.

MANUAL DE BALCEDO.

New-Orleans, May 18, 1803.

His Excellency W. C. C. CLAIBONE.

By a treaty concluded at Paris, on the 30th of April last, between the United States of America and the French Republic, Louisiana, in its *full extent* was ceded to America on the following terms:—1st, 11,250,000 dollars to be paid to France in 6 per cents. three months after the delivery of the country.——2d. An assumpsit, not exceeding 3,750,000 dollars, on the part of America, of the debts and captures provided for under the Convention of September, 1800.—3d. The admission of French and Spanish vessels, laden with the merchandize of their country, and coming directly from its ports, into the ports of the ceded countries, for twelve years, without paying a higher duty than Americans: a privilege which is to be extended to no other nation. The country is to be delivered up immediately on the ratification of the treaty, and it is to be incorporated with the United States, as soon as it can be done, consistently with the American Constitution.

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